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FICTIONS OF OMNISCIENCE
Karen Petroski*
Recent studies of the legislative process have questioned the rationales
for many principles of statutory interpretation. One of those traditional
rationales is the so-called fiction of legislative omniscience, which has been
understood to underpin many canons and interpretive practices that courts
use in applying statutes. This Article presents the first comprehensive
analysis of this phenomenon and proposes a new way to understand it.
From this perspective, judicial assumptions of unrealistic legislative
knowledge are not the unfair demands on legislatures that most
commentators have considered them to be, but reassertions of the rules of
the game judges and lawyers are playing. Far from impairing judicial
legitimacy, imputations of omniscience to the legislature are expressions of
the grounds of judicial legitimacy.
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INTRODUCTION
A statute is the expressed will of the legislative organ of society, but until
the dealers in psychic forces succeed in making of thought transference a
working controllable force (and the psychic transference of the thought of an
artificial body must stagger the most advanced of the ghost hunters), the will
of the legislature has to be expressed by words, spoken or written.1

As John Chipman Gray’s ironically resigned conclusion suggests, at the
beginning of the twentieth century, legal commentators and judges were not
pleased by any hint that their activities smacked of the supernatural. Things
have not changed all that much in the century since. Recent empirical work
on the legislative process echoes Gray’s concerns and mirrors his desire to
purge legal discourse of any hint of the fantastic. Professors Abbe Gluck
and Lisa Shultz Bressman put it this way in a recent article: “A threshold
question for any empirical study of Congress is why interpreters treat rules
that they believe to be fictions as benign ones.”2 Their clear implication is
that rules believed to be fictions should not be understood to be benign, at
least not without some good explanation.
In that article and its companion, Gluck and Bressman make important
contributions to a recent trend in scholarship on statutory interpretation,
which has moved from broad theoretical questions toward empirical studies
and narrower doctrinal investigations, and which has in many instances
questioned longstanding justifications for specific principles of statutory
interpretation, including classic canons of construction.3 One such
longstanding justification is the assumption of legislative “omniscience,”4
which commentators understand to underpin many canons and practices.
This fiction proposes that the legislature, as the agent responsible for
enacting statutes, is somehow “aware,” when it enacts those statutes, of all
its past enactments as well as the ways those enactments have been applied
by courts and agencies, and that courts may proceed to apply the
1

JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 170 (1909; 2d ed.
1921).
2
Abbe Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 901, 915 (2013).
3
See Gluck & Bressman, supra note ___; see also, e.g., James J. Brudney, Canon
Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1199,
1201-02 (2010) (offering new critique of reliance on canons).
4
See Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983); see also discussion of the “omniscience”
label infra note ___.
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legislature’s enactments in light of that awareness. Part I of this Article
explains in detail the alleged pervasiveness of this assumption, its fictional
features, and the arguments that have been made against it.
Many of those arguments, Part I explains, are little more than an epithet:
“fiction!” Strangely, critiques of the assumption of legislative omniscience
have seldom drawn on the substantial (if outdated) literature on legal
fictions. This failure might be due, as Part II.A suggests, to the deficiencies
of that literature, which confirms the distaste judges and especially
commentators have for legal fictions, but which does not otherwise describe
practices that look much like the assumptions of legislative omniscience
described in Part I. Still, the impression that those assumptions are fictions
of some kind remains. This mismatch between theory and practice suggests
that our traditional understanding of legal fictions may be incomplete.
Exploring and confirming that hypothesis, Part II.B surveys the advances
made in recent decades within other disciplines, including philosophy,
cognitive science, and literary studies, in understanding the features of
fictional discourse. Legal scholars have no good reason to continue to
ignore this work, Part II concludes.
To explore the broader importance of both an updated understanding of
legal fictions and a more nuanced grasp of assumptions of legislative
omniscience, Part III explores some other situations in which judges assume
that real or legally constructed figures have knowledge that is either
empirically or logically unlikely. These situations include doctrines of
constructive notice across multiple areas of law; the traditional prohibition
on asserting ignorance of law as a defense to a criminal prosecution, often
described as imputing a knowledge of the law to the criminal defendant;
and the fictional figure of the “person having ordinary skill in the art” of
patent law, which attributes to that person, among other characteristics,
knowledge of all “prior art.” The presence of legal constructs sharing
features with assumptions of legislative omniscience elsewhere in the law
supports the proposal advanced in Parts I and II that those assumptions
might be products of something other than judicial ignorance or evasion.
Part IV returns to the central question of this Article: do assumptions of
legislative omniscience undermine judicial legitimacy by painting an
unrealistic portrait of lawmakers? This concluding discussion proposes an
alternative way of understanding judicial imputations of omniscience to
legislatures that challenges that traditional view. On this account, these
imputations are productive fictions, parts of a broader story judicial
discourse tells about the aspirations of the legal system. Imputations of
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omniscience are not imperfect empirical assessments of legislative reality,
but direct expressions of the grounds of judicial legitimacy, which are, and
will always be, ideals to be sought, not events that have already occurred.
I. FICTIONS OF LEGISLATIVE OMNISCIENCE
Not uncommonly, a court will explain its conclusions regarding the
meaning or application of statutory language by reference to information
that the court assumes was known to “the legislature.” Often, this
assumption concerns the legislature’s awareness of its own
contemporaneous output,5 the output of earlier sessions of the same
legislature,6 or the way courts and agencies have interpreted the output of
such earlier sessions. 7 This legislative knowledge is assumed to extend, as
well, to judicial decisions8 and practices9 that are not necessarily directly
tied to the statutory provision that the court is currently applying. In
jurisdictions where voters have power to create law directly, courts will
impute similar awareness to the voters as a collective lawmaker.10
This Article, following the practice of many legal writers, takes these
assumptions as imputing a kind of “omniscience” to the legislature.11 Such
5

See, e.g., Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986)
(“[I]dentical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same
meaning.”)
6
See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (directing
application of statute in manner “most compatible with the surrounding body of law into
which the provision must be integrated—a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we
assume Congress always has in mind”).
7
See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) (“[W]here Congress adopts a
new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress . . . can be presumed to have had
knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects
the new statute.”).
8
See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-98 (1979) (noting that it is
reasonable to for courts to presume that Congress is aware of judicial precedent); Holmes
v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 287 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Judicial inference of a zone-of-interests requirement . . . is a background practice against
which Congress legislates.”).
9
See, e.g., Astoria Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991)
(“Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory
principles. . . .”).
10
See, e.g., In re Harris, 49 Cal. 3d 131, 136 (1989) (“[T]he drafters who frame an
initiative and the voters who enact it may be deemed to be aware of the judicial
construction of the law that served as its source.”).
11
The scare quotes indicate that the knowledge courts attribute to lawmaking bodies is
not omniscience in the strictest sense; among other things, the knowledge courts deem
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an imputation has long been criticized by commentators, but recently those
critiques have gained a new dimension based on studies of the practices of
and information available to real-life legislators and legislative drafters. A
principal goal of this Article is to assess these imputations of omniscience
in light of the new empirical critiques. First, however, it will describe the
role that assumptions of omniscience play in legal justification and the
different forms these assumptions take.
Part I.A undertakes this
background task; Part II.B clarifies commentators’ critiques of these
assumptions, and Part I.C situates the current debate in this context.
A. The Scope and Function of the Fictions
In a 1990 article, Professors Moglen and Pierce described the
imputations noted above as examples of “the largely implicit factual
assumptions that judges make about the group behavior of legislators that
are and have been the foundation of judicial interpretation of legislative
documents.”12
Moglen and Pierce identified these assumptions as
“fictions.” Relatively often, as in the examples given above, courts present
such assumptions of omniscience directly in justification of a result.13 But
according to commentators, the assumptions also have a close relation to a
number of other statutory interpretation practices, including many canons.
Judge Posner, indeed, has described imputations of omniscience as the
principal justification for most canons.14 When the assumptions serve this
purpose, they are not always directly asserted by judges, but sometimes are
read into judicial reasoning after the fact by commentators.

legislatures to have is primarily knowledge of legal texts. Cf. Jonathan Culler,
Omniscience, 21:1 NARRATIVE 22 (2004), discussed further infra notes ___ and
accompanying text (discussing misuses of “omniscience” label). Still, the knowledge
courts impute to legislatures is in many cases knowledge that actual legislators would not
have, and there is a long tradition of referring to it as “omniscience.” See discussions infra
Part I.A.2.b.
12
Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein’s New Canons: Choosing the
Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1211 (1990).
13
See supra notes ___ [beginning of Part I] for examples, and see table infra note ___.
14
See Posner, supra note ___, at 811; see also, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra
note ___, at 915 (2013) (“[T]he fiction of the unitary drafter . . . undergirds a huge number
of interpretive rules. . . .”); Moglen & Pierce, supra note ___, at 1209 (“[T]he source of
canons of construction, like other rules of interpretation, remains fiction.”); Abbe Gluck &
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, forthcoming STAN. L. REV.
[hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part II], MS at 3, 5 (contending that accuracy about
“details of congressional practice” is important to justifying canons of interpretation).
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Part IV will suggest that we should evaluate these two forms of the
assumption differently. But to clarify the commentators’ complaints, Part
I.A.1 will briefly enumerate the array of statutory-interpretation practices to
which such assumptions have been linked. Part I.A.2 then examines the
structure of the assumptions, regardless of who is making them: whose
knowledge is assumed, and what those “knowers” are assumed to have
knowledge of. Despite a long tradition of criticism of these assumptions,
they have never before been systematically analyzed in this way.
1. Canons and Practices Presupposing Legislative Omniscience
Judicial assumptions of legislative omniscience are often explicit,15 but
just as often, according to commentators, other judicial practices simply
presuppose legislative omniscience. These practices run the gamut from
textual and structural canons of interpretation, to so-called substantive and
extrinsic-source canons, to broader methodological positions on the
appropriate judicial attitude toward statutory interpretation.
A number of widely followed textual and structural canons have been
described as presupposing legislative omniscience. The expressio unius
canon, for example, which directs a court to conclude that matter not
expressly provided for in a statute’s text is outside the statute’s coverage,
has been characterized as based on an assumption of omniscience, “because
it would make sense only if all omissions in legislative drafting were
deliberate.”16 The rule against surplusage, instructing courts to give
independent meaning to every word of an enactment, has also been so
described.17 Even more obviously based on assumptions of omniscience are
the presumptions of consistent usage underlying the “whole act” and
“whole code” rules, which direct courts to give a word the same meaning
everywhere it appears in an enactment or even the entire body of a
legislature’s output.18 This presumption, if understood as tethered to
15

See infra note ___ [table of search results].
Posner, supra note ___, at 813; see also William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress
Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 226-27 (2000) (noting that
canon “makes greatest sense if the starting premise is something close to an omniscient
legislative drafter”).
17
Posner, supra note ___, at 812.
18
Stephen H. Sutro, Interpretation of Initiatives by Reference to Similar Statutes:
Canons of Construction Do Not Adequately Measure Voter Intent, 34 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 945, 959 (1994) (“[W]hen legislators adopt language of earlier statutes in new
laws, . . . it is plausible to assume that . . . the legislature acted with knowledge of the
previous law.”); Buzbee, supra note ___, at 173 (noting that the “cross-referencing of . . .
16
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legislative rather than judicial choices, appears to impute to the legislature
awareness of the ways particular words were used, and were meant to be
used, in enactments by previous sessions of the legislature.19
Commentators have also tied other well-known canons to assumptions
of legislative omniscience. Both the avoidance canon, which directs courts
to apply statutes so as to avoid constitutional concerns, 20 and the rule of
lenity, which instructs courts to construe ambiguous criminal statutes
favorably to defendants,21 have been so explained. Canons that base
inferences on legislative action (or inaction) following judicial
interpretation of the provision being applied are especially difficult to
explain without reference to assumptions of legislative omniscience; of all
the canons discussed here, these are the ones most often involving express
judicial assertions about legislative knowledge. 22 Like all the canons, of
provisions in different statutes is often justified with the use of the fiction that there is one
Congress that knows how to achieve a certain goal . . . when ‘Congress wants’ to do
so. . . .”); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 104 (1997) (referring to “fiction” underlying principle that statutes should be
construed as internally consistent and “compatible with previously enacted laws”).
19
Other structural canons seem to rest on similar assumptions. These include the
presumption against repeals by implication (the rule that an earlier statute conflicting with
a later one should be construed so as to keep both earlier and later enactments in effect);
see Posner, supra note ___, at 812 (noting that the assumption that “whenever Congress
enacts a new statute it combs the United States Code for possible inconsistencies with the
new statute . . . would imply legislative omniscience in a particularly . . . unrealistic
form. . . .”); the in pari materia rule (the rule that enactments on similar subjects should be
construed consistently with one another); see Sutro, supra note ___, at 957 (“In pari
materia rests on the premise that ‘when a legislature enacts a provision, it has available all
the other provisions relating to the same subject matter. . . .’”); and the “borrowed statute”
rule (the rule that when a legislature enacts a measure modeled on an enactment in another
jurisdiction, the new enactment should be applied consistently with its application in the
originating context); see id. at 958 (“Where the legislature of one jurisdiction adopts a
provision . . . from another jurisdiction, it is presumed that the enactment was made with
knowledge of the prior interpretation. . . .”).
20
James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 79 (1994) (noting
grounding of avoidance canon in “the assumption that legislators should be regarded as
reasonably aware of the existence of potential constitutional conflicts, including judicial
decisions identifying such conflicts. . . .”).
21
Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note ___, at 958 (“[J]udges and theorists have
been . . . wedded to justifying lenity on the basis of congressional knowledge.”).
22
These canons include the reenactment rule, which holds that “reenactment without
change of a statute that the courts have interpreted in a particular way may be taken as
evidence that the reenactment adopts that construction,” see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 71 (1988), and the acquiescence
rule, which holds that a legislature’s failure to amend a statute indicates assent to
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course, these are applied irregularly. Courts do not always assume
congressional awareness of prior judicial interpretations of statutes, but will
sometimes point out the unlikeliness of that assumption. 23 Still, courts
engage in these practices often enough to have made them the subject of
extensive commentary. 24
Assumptions of legislative omniscience might also underpin broader
positions on appropriate methods of statutory interpretation, including the
two main such positions today, those advocated by purposivists and
textualists. Purposivist interpretation in the Hart and Sacks mold, which
posits “reasonable legislators” as the generators of statutory text, also seems
to presuppose that those legislators—not unlike the reasonable persons of
other areas of law—have access to information that might not be available
to their real-life counterparts.25 Textualism has a more complex relation to
assumptions of legislative omniscience. Some aspects of textualism imply a
more cynical view of legislators’ capacities than purposivism does.26 On
the other hand, textualists rely heavily on many of the canons that seem
closely linked to assumptions of legislative omniscience,27 and they
sometimes justify this reliance as a means of “disciplining” the legislature
to draft more consistently, apparently presupposing legislators’ awareness

controlling judicial interpretations of that statute.
23
See Eskridge, Inaction, supra note ___, at 75-76 (noting that “the Court [often] . . .
explain[s] away legislative inaction by reference to Congress’ ignorance of the prior
interpretation or to the lack of a clear line of interpretation by an agency or the courts.”).
24
See, e.g., Eskridge, Inaction, supra note ___; Brudney, Chatter, supra note ___.
25
HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, 2 THE LEGAL PROCESS 1148-79 (1958).
See also Moglen & Pierce, supra note ___, at 1212 (noting Hart & Sacks’ awareness that
their approach rested on a fiction); STEVEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 88 (2005) (“At the
heart of a purpose-based approach stands ‘the reasonable member of Congress’—a legal
fiction. . . .”); Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the
Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1148-49
(2011) (describing purposivist view of Congress as “far too rosy”).
26
See, e.g., Nourse, supra note ___, at 1134 (“Textualists . . . rely upon theories that
treat Congress with contempt—assuming that its decisions can never be rational. . . .”);
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV.
885, 886 (2003) (arguing that “legislation scholars generally work with . . . a jaundiced
view of the capacities of . . . legislatures”).
27
Cf. Buzbee, supra note ___, at 180 (arguing that the “Supreme Court has in recent
years made frequent use of the one-Congress fiction in its statutory interpretation cases.”);
Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative
Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 851-53 (2014) (describing “a generally acknowledged
trend toward textualist interpretation [relying on ordinary meaning and textual canons
rather than legislative history or policy arguments] . . . over the last fifty years”).
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of judicial activity. 28
Judges do not make assumptions of legislative omniscience in every
statutory case, and sometimes they explicitly disavow making such
assumptions. Still, the notion seems to play a role in many accounts, by
commentators and by judges themselves, of what judges are doing when
they interpret and apply statutes. It is therefore a little surprising that these
assumptions have never been systematically dissected. The next section
considers their structure.
2. False or Improbable Suppositions Involved
Most assumptions of legislative omniscience involve two distinct
suppositions that are potentially contrary to fact. One such supposition is
that the legislature may be treated as a single intentional body. The other is
that this entity has some kind of “omniscience.” These two suppositions are
subject to somewhat different criticisms.
a. Whose Knowledge?
Assumptions of legislative omniscience seem to depend, as Professor
Buzbee observed in a 2000 article, on imputation of a collective “mind” to
the legislature: “In opinions employing the one-Congress fiction [the
treatment of successive sessions of the legislature as the same intending
body], the legislature is often anthropomorphized, in the sense that it is
treated as if it were a single natural person, albeit a person of superhuman
omniscience and consistency of style.”29 This sort of personification of the
legislature has long been questioned, apart from any imputation of
omniscience to the personified body. Max Radin’s 1934 broadside
described it as an indefensible ascription of mental properties to something

28

See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve the Legislative
Process: Can It Be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J. L. & POL. 105, 157-58 (1997)
(“[S]yntax canons may . . . aid Congress in understanding how the judiciary will interpret
its statutes, by providing it with a set of assumptions about how its statutes will be
interpreted.”). But see, e.g., Nourse, supra note ___, at 1174 (“[C]ourts do not have the
institutional capacity to discipline themselves to send a consistent enough message to
Congress to change its behavior. . . .”).
29
Buzbee, supra note ___, at 204-05. Professor Buzbee notes the irony of the fiction
as a justification for textual canons, since it involves “an odd . . . anthropomorphizing of
the legislature by justices who generally shun any references to legislative intent [and]
decline to draw inferences from legislative silence.” Id. at 245.
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that by definition lacks them. 30 This argument first observes the
impossibility of individual legislators’ having access to one another’s
mental states in a way that would allow observers to consider all those
diverse mental states part of a single one. The argument also asks how an
after-the-fact interpreter could ever gain access to this mental state, were it
to exist. It is thus not just an argument about conceptual categories, but also
one about cognitive limitations—an argument about how unrealistic it is to
assume anyone is telepathic. Radin’s and similar arguments have been
enormously influential31 but have never completely prevailed. Judicial
opinions and commentary continue to refer to legislative “intent” and even
to argue for the value of that label. 32
Recent scholarship, described in more detail in Part I.B below, has
added to this conceptual criticism of legislative personification an empirical
dimension, inspired by the emphasis that text-focused interpretation places
on the details of legislative language. If courts are concerned with the
precise linguistic formulations enacted, this argument goes, then courts
should consider who actually produces those formulations. (Similarly, if
courts want to discipline the generators of statutory language, they would
do well to identify those generators accurately.) More often than not, those
who craft statutory language are not elected members of the legislature,33
but professional drafters (career civil servants),34 legislative staffers, 35 or
lobbyists.36 Even if we were to accept that elected legislators could act with
30

See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1934) (“That
the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense is almost an immediate
inference. . . . The chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the same
determinate situations in mind . . . are infinitesimally small.”).
31
Peter Smith has argued that rejection of legislative intent as a fiction is a central
tenet of textualism. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1462-63
(2007).
32
See, e.g., Richard Elkins & Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Reality and Indispensability of
Legislative Intentions, 36 SYDNEY L. REV. 39 (2014). Professor Bressman has argued that
the legislative intent construct is a fiction, but an “ordinary” and harmless, if not necessary,
one. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional
Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2012-13, 2046-47 (2011).
33
Brudney, Chatter, supra note ___, at 53 (“Most members [of Congress] most of the
time do not participate in any way in drafting the text on which they are asked to vote.”)
34
See generally Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note ___; Gluck & Bressman, Part II,
supra note ___; Shobe, supra note ___.
35
Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note ___.
36
See, e.g., Shobe, supra note ___, at 847-49 (noting increase in “lobbyist involvement
in the drafting process . . . over the past twenty years”); Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra
note ___, MS at 30 (noting that more than a third of the drafters interviewed by the authors
described first drafts of bills as “typically written by . . . policy experts and outside groups,
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one “mind” accessible to interpreters, this newer argument presents
problems for treating statutory text as the creation of a single intending
agent. For one thing, non-legislator drafters are not members of the
political and legal body to which courts profess fidelity. A distinct
problem, harking back to Radin’s concern, is that drafters do not necessarily
communicate the information they know to elected legislators. Can the
matters known to non-elected drafters nevertheless be imputed to
legislators? Should they be? I return to these questions below.
b. Knowledge of What?
The second set of potentially unrealistic suppositions involved in
assumptions of legislative omniscience concerns the knowledge assumed,
taking for granted that there is some thing that could “know” it. Here, too,
the simple label “legislative omniscience” conceals some complexity.
Some of the knowledge imputed to legislators or legislatures is unlikely to
have been known to any real human lawmaker or drafter because of
ordinary cognitive limitations and the volume of information involved. But
some of the knowledge imputed would be logically and existentially
impossible for anyone to have.
The first category, in turn, embraces two kinds of imputed knowledge:
knowledge about non-technical (i.e., nonlegal) matters, such as the contents
of other legislators’ minds and regularities of language usage,37 and, more
commonly, knowledge of specific legal information, such as other
provisions of “the code,”38 the acts and intentions of previous sessions of
the legislature,39 intervening judicial or agency decisions relating to a
previous version of the statute being interpreted or to related statutes,40
and/or interpretive principles used by courts.41
like lobbyists”).
37
Cf. Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies
and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1936 (2010)
(explaining how “human intuition about lexical frequency is frequently unreliable”).
38
Posner, supra note ___, at 806 (“There is no evidence that members of Congress, or
their assistants who do the actual drafting, know the code. . . .”).
39
See especially Buzbee, supra note ___, at 173 (discussed supra note ___, concerning
whole code rule).
40
Posner, supra note ___, at 813-14 (see also supra note ___, concerning reenactment
rule); Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal
Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 816 (2002) (“[F]or statutes enacted between 1964 and
1975, the Court had usually presumed that Congress was likely to have relied on the liberal
implication [of private rights of action] standards at the time. . . .”).
41
See, e.g., Brudney, Chatter, supra note ___, at 78-79 (noting that “reliance [on the
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The second category—of knowledge that would by definition be
impossible for drafters or legislators to have—includes knowledge of
scenarios to which the statute might, in future, be argued to apply. 42 This
category also includes the knowledge imputed to drafters and legislators of
the content and judicial interpretations of statutes not yet enacted or
proposed at the time of enactment of the statute being applied.43
These areas of imputed knowledge are analytically distinguishable but
sometimes superimposed. Professor Buzbee described the phenomenon as
a matter of “layers of knowledge”: “[I]nterpretive inferences from
interstatutory comparison . . . require at least one, if not both . . . enacting
Congresses to have the following highly unlikely layers of knowledge[:] . . .
(1) [knowledge of] what laws will be the subject of interstatutory
comparison, (2) [knowledge of] what linguistic consistency or inconsistency
will be found significant by a reviewing court, and (3) [knowledge of a
shared] common set of ‘interpretive conventions[.]’”44 As Professor
Buzbee’s account suggests, he considers the “highly unlikely” nature of this
state of affairs—this compounding of impossibilities—to constitute a
significant problem for the practices that rest on these assumptions. His
critical attitude toward assumptions of legislative omniscience is typical of
contemporary commentators’ views, the subject of the next two sections.
B. Criticisms and Defenses
Although he was not the first to make the observation,45 Judge Posner
canons] is justified in part by the assumption that legislators should be thought of as
reasonably attentive to and in agreement with the ‘background of customs and
understandings of the way things are done.’”); Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of
Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 398 (1998)
(“[I]t is reasonable to presume that when Congress remains silent about the meaning of a
particular statutory term, it has done so with the expectation that the term will be construed
in a fashion consistent with prevailing canons of statutory interpretation.”).
42
Posner, supra note ___, at 811 (“[A] statute necessarily is drafted in advance of, and
with imperfect appreciation for the problems that will be encountered in, its application.”);
cf. Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing
and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 61 (1991).
43
Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory
Interpretation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1126 (2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court sometimes
applies the one-Congress fiction in order to render statutory language consistent with a
judicial interpretation of a . . . statute that was enacted after the statute in question. . . .”).
44
Buzbee, supra note ___, at 234.
45
See infra note ___ [citation from Helvering v. Hallock].
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has done much to highlight the phenomenon of imputing omniscience to the
legislature. In 1983, he wrote: “Most canons of statutory construction go
wrong not because they misconceive the nature of judicial interpretation or
of the legislative or political process but because they impute omniscience
to Congress. Omniscience is always an unrealistic assumption, and
particularly so when one is dealing with the legislative process.” 46 Judge
Posner’s position is now virtually orthodoxy among commentators,47 and
his complaint about the “unrealistic” character of the assumption remains
the core of criticism of the practice. But this criticism is not completely
uniform, and it has not gone without response. This part summarizes the
main arguments against assuming legislative omniscience, and the
responses to those arguments by commentators. Part I.C assesses the
current state of the debate after recent empirical interventions.
1. Criticism of the Fictions of Legislative Omniscience
The longest-lived argument against assumptions of legislative
omniscience, as the quote above from Judge Posner suggests, is that they
are descriptively inaccurate. In 1940, Justice Jackson characterized
inferences from legislative inaction as based on “speculative unrealities”
46

Posner, supra note ___, at 811.
See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance—Steps for
Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1046-47
(1991); James L. Buckley, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial
Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241 (May 22-24, 1988);
Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 59-60 (2007)
(“[N]either members of Congress nor their staffs are cognizant of the great majority of
judicial decisions addressing legislation within the jurisdiction of their committees”); John
C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into
“Speculative Unrealities,” 64 B.U. L. REV. 737, 758 (1985) (noting that arguments from
legislative acquiescence, if based on the assumption that Congress is aware of judicial
interpretations, are “absurd” given the “increase in the number of judicial decisions”); Eric
Lane, Legislative Process and Its Judicial Renderings: A Study in Contrast, 48 U. PITT. L.
REV. 629, 656 (1987) (“I agree with Judge Posner that . . . [t]o the extent that [the canons’]
applicability requires legislative awareness that ‘the legislature is deemed to have
knowledge of the rules of construction,’ this is not the case.”); Robert A. Katzmann,
Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge of Positive
Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653 (1992); Moglen & Pierce, supra note ___, at 1211
(“[M]ost legislators are ignorant of the overwhelming majority of ‘legislative history.’
Frequently, they are entirely unaware of the literal content of the statute itself.”); Shobe,
supra note ___, at 809 (summarizing comments to this effect). But see Levin, supra note
___, at 1127 (arguing that “the public is justified in relying on the one-Congress fiction to
inform a statute’s meaning” and that “the Court should adopt the one-Congress fiction
because it protects and respects legitimate reliance and expectations interests”).
47
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and “quicksand.”48 Writing thirty years after Judge Posner, Professors
Gluck and Bressman have largely reiterated this argument, at least as it
concerns drafters’ awareness of (and agreement with) canons, with
extensive empirical support.49 Assessing the current state of legal opinion,
they note, with agreement, that it is a “common notion that the ‘omniscient’
drafter assumption is a fiction.”50
Descriptive inaccuracy is the main problem with assumptions of
legislative omniscience, but not the only one. Judge Posner, again, was
among the first to point out other negative consequences flowing from such
assumptions. Canons based on assumptions of legislative omniscience, he
wrote, “promot[e] ‘judicial activism’” by “making statutory interpretation
seem mechanical rather than creative,” thereby “conceal[ing,] often from
the reader of the judicial opinions and sometimes from the writer, the extent
to which the judge is making new law in the guise of interpreting a statute
or a constitutional provision.”51 Professor Buzbee, in his critique of the
“one-Congress fiction” used to justify canons of consistent usage, makes a
similar point.52 Ultimately, Professors Gluck and Bressman agree, although
they use less accusatory language: “[W]e can best understand these rule of
law canons [such as the presumption of consistent usage] . . . in terms of
their appearance of neutrality and the related desire to constrain judicial
48

Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 120 (1940).
Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note ___, at 907 (2013) (noting “a host of canons
that our respondents [congressional counsel] told us they did not use, either because they
were unaware that the courts relied on them or despite known judicial reliance [because of
the respondents’ awareness of their descriptive inaccuracy]”); id. at 954 (noting that, for
the rule against superfluities and presumptions of consistent usage, “none of the publicly
stated justifications for their application holds”). Professors Gluck and Bressman’s articles
respond to commentators’ habit of referring to the so-called “descriptive” canons as
“accurate generalizations of the way legislators communicate through statutory text.”
Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its
Lonely Eyes To You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 572 (1992). Professor Ross also argued that
inaccuracy is grounds for rejecting an interpretive practice: “As for the canon that nothing
in statutory text can be treated as surplusage, even if Congress were too embarrassed to
admit to its sloppy drafting habits by overturning the canon itself, perhaps this canon too is
so contrary to real life experience that courts should simply stop using it.” Id.
50
Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note ___, MS at 12.
51
Posner, supra note ___, at 816-17.
52
Buzbee, supra note ___, at 236-37 (“When courts start to refer to materials other
than the primary textual provision . . ., they . . . have given themselves a more open
interpretive field. . . .”) See also Grabow, supra note ___, at 752 (“By attributing to
Congress’ silence its acquiescence in a judicial or administrative construction . . ., the
Court is able to act as if it is merely finding rather than making the law. This allows the
Court . . . to shield its exercise of choice.”).
49
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discretion.”53 Even if courts do not intend to deceive by assuming
legislative omniscience, these assumptions could also be construed as signs
of a distinct judicial vice—not surreptitious activism, but laziness or
professional narcissism, a disinclination to learn more about the realities of
legislative process and practice. 54
A separate set of objections to assuming legislative omniscience, much
less prominent in commentary on statutory interpretation, is based not on
concerns with inaccuracy, but on concerns with incoherence; assumptions
of legislative omniscience seem to be inconsistent with some other judicial
practices. One such argument would note that in their other interactions
with legislatures, especially when reviewing the constitutionality of statutes,
courts often assume not legislative omniscience, but legislative ignorance.55
Another would note that courts cannot consistently impute to the legislature
a kind of awareness that courts themselves lack and occasionally admit to
lacking. 56 A deeper critique, harking back to Professor Radin, would
contend that even if the entire universe of legal information were known to
legislators, that information lacks any coherence.57
Given the breadth of agreement that, for whatever reason, assumptions
of legislative omniscience are indefensible, what explains their persistent
use, both in explicit judicial statements and as unstated premises for such a
wide array of judicial practices? One possibility is that the assumptions are
not always as problematic as the commentary has assumed. Eventually, I
will argue for this position, but as I show below, this argument has not
53

Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note ___, at 962-63.
See, e.g., Muriel Morisey, Liberating Legal Education from the Judicial Model, 27
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 231, 267 (2003) (“The canons of construction and convenient
judicial maxims are used as substitutes for careful statutory analysis.”).
55
See especially Muriel Morisey Spence, What Congress Knows and Sometimes
Doesn’t Know, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 653, 660 (1996) (noting the Supreme Court’s
“movement away from judicial deference to Congress’ factual deliberations and
conclusions” in certain areas of constitutional law). Spence argues that this movement is
related to, or at least shares affinities with, textualism, in that both “enhance judicial power
at the expense of Congress.” See id. at 679-81.
56
Cf. Moglen & Pierce, supra note ___, at 1232 (1990) (“[The] actual caseload [of
judges] precludes them from engaging in extensive research to determine the combination
of political pathologies that gave rise to a particular statutory provision. . . .”); id. at 1233,
1241-42, 1244 (discussing inevitability of inconsistency in interpretive conclusions, given
distributed nature of federal judiciary and limited caseload capacity of Supreme Court).
57
See, e.g., Eskridge, Inaction, supra note ___, at 83 (“Congress cannot be presumed
to ‘know’ an administrative interpretation that is unsettled even in the minds of the
administrators.”).
54
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previously been made and defended in a way that avoids the criticisms just
outlined. Another possibility is that some judicial practices that we view as
based on this assumption can be better justified on other grounds.
Professors Gluck and Bressman have suggested this possibility in their
recent work, discussed in Part I.C. Before examining their position, I turn
to existing defenses of assumptions of legislative omniscience.
2. Responses to the Criticisms
Occasionally, courts and commentators assert the legitimacy of
assumptions of legislative omniscience without considering their descriptive
accuracy. 58 Such assertions have become more vulnerable, however, as the
criticisms described above have become more widely accepted.
Alternatively, one might directly question the main critique of
assumptions of legislative omniscience:
the claim that they are
descriptively inaccurate. This response could be understood as a challenge
to the “omniscience” label. Some judicial practices can be justified, that is,
as assuming something less than legislative omniscience or telepathy.
Professor Buzbee, for instance, has argued that the expressio unius canon is
less offensive on the score of descriptive inaccuracy than is the practice of
applying the same interpretation to the same term when it appears in
statutory provisions enacted at different times.59 Other scholars have
pointed out that many drafters examine statutory context before drafting a
new provision;60 that official drafting manuals reflect some of the canons
often justified by reference to legislative omniscience;61 that committee
58

See, e.g., supra notes ___ [beginning of Part I]; Mank, supra note ___, at 868 (“It is
appropriate to assume that Congress is aware of significant judicial decisions when it
enacts a statute.”); Davies, supra note ___, at 398 (“The notion that Congress legislates
against the backdrop of existing law—including both statutory and judge-made law—is no
novel proposition.”).
59
Buzbee, supra note ___, at 228-29 (“The expressio unius canon . . . is . . .
aspirational, but it does not rest on counterfactual assumptions of omniscient legislators
able to know both the universe of similar provisions in other statutes and which statutes
and linguistic differences would be viewed as significant by a reviewing court.”). See also,
e.g., Ross, supra note ___, at 574 n.70 (“Although legislators cannot be expected to be
fully cognizant of the entire statutory corpus juris, it is unlikely that drafters will use
virtually identical language from related statutes by accident.”).
60
Cf. Barry Jeffrey Stern, Teaching Legislative Drafting: A Simulation Approach, 38
J. LEGAL EDUC. 391, 394 (1988) (“I ask students to accompany their drafts with
commentary that reviews the coverage of the proposed statutes and highlights differences
between the proposal and existing law.”).
61
See BJ Ard, Comment, Interpreting by the Book: Legislative Drafting Manuals and
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staff may be aware of “major” judicial decisions relevant to proposed
legislation;62 and that legislators sometimes do register awareness of (some)
judicial interpretations in legislative history documents.63 Professors Gluck
and Bressman acknowledge that some drafters are aware of, and rely on,
some judicial practices, including some canons and case law, consistent
with judicial assumptions to this effect.64 A recent article by Jarrod Shobe,
discussed at more length in Part I.C, explains in detail how drafters’
examination of statutory context and relevant judicial actions, as well as
awareness of judicial practices in applying statutes, has become more and
more common practice in the federal legislature since the 1990s.65
A slightly different response to criticisms of assuming legislative
omniscience accepts omniscience as a worthwhile goal and seeks to
increase the descriptive accuracy of the assumption by, in effect, enabling
closer approximations to omniscience through institutional design.
Mechanisms already exist in many states for informing legislators of
judicial activity, and of the effects of particular enactments on other parts of
Statutory Interpretation, 120 YALE L.J. 185, 193 (2010) (listing canons of consistent usage,
rule against surplusage, and the rule against implied repeals as “supported by federal
legislative drafting manuals”).
62
Frost, supra note ___, at 4 (noting that “on many occasions Congress has recognized
judicial confusion about the meaning of legislation and amended unclear statutory
language”); id. at 29-33 (discussing studies documenting this recognition, including
Stefanie A. Lindquist & David A. Yalof, Congressional Responses to Federal Circuit
Court Decisions, 85 JUDICATURE 61 (2001)); but see also Buzbee, supra note ___, at 211
& n.139 (2000) (citing Katzmann, supra note ___, at 662 (reporting the results of a project
on statutory revision finding that, in most instances, committee staff were not aware of
relevant court decisions unless they were “major” in some way)).
63
See Brudney, Chatter, supra note ___, at 64 (“[I]f a reenacted statute contains
numerous and substantial modifications in text, if it was enacted following a more inclusive
legislative process, and if the case commented on by the committee has been more
prominently featured in public debate, there is a stronger basis for imputing such
familiarity and endorsement to Congress.”).
64
See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note ___, at 949 (2013) (describing
“feedback canons”); id. at 948 (“Thirteen percent [of respondents] . . . said that they
examine prior [constitutional] case law . . . in anticipation of judicial ruling.”).
65
Shobe, supra note ___, at 813 (“Today, statutes are more thoroughly researched and
written by large groups of experts who are more aware of what courts and agencies are
doing than ever before. . . .”); id. at 827 (“Legislative counsel view part of their role as
helping staff to understand the existing statutory framework and how a new bill will fit into
that framework. . . .”); id. at 831-32 (arguing that legislative drafters are aware of canons of
interpretation); id. at 842 (noting that “attorneys in ALD [an office of the Congressional
Research Service] are especially responsible for providing analysis of case law and
constitutional issues, while legislative counsel are especially attuned to how laws fit in to
the current statutory scheme”).
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the jurisdiction’s code—and vice versa, informing judges of legislative
activity responding to judicial interpretations.66 A similar mechanism has
been repeatedly recommended at the federal level. 67 Jarrod Shobe’s
position, noted above, is that we are basically already there: he maintains
that such mechanisms do exist de facto in the federal Congress, through the
combined efforts of drafters in the Office of Legislative Counsel, the
American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service, and
committee staffers.68
Not all responses to the criticisms outlined in Part I.B.1 focus on
descriptive accuracy. Some commentators have argued that it is just not
necessary to assume legislative omniscience because the practices usually
justified by reference to this assumption can be justified on other grounds,
such as an independent judicial obligation to ensure legal coherence. 69
Most recently, Professors Gluck and Bressman have suggested that many
canons “derive their most powerful justification from ‘rule of law’ norms—
the idea that interpretive rules should coordinate systemic behavior or
impose coherence on the corpus juris. . . . Justices Scalia and Breyer . . .
have suggested that even fictitious canons are justifiable on the ground that
it is the role of courts to impose systemic coherence on the law.”70 This
position is not strictly speaking a defense of the assumption of omniscience,
but an argument for retention of some of the practices traditionally justified
by reference to the assumption.

66

See Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note ___, at 1060-72 (describing such
mechanisms in North Carolina, Alaska, Oregon, New York, and Mississippi).
67
See, e.g., Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note ___, at 1048, 1076 (describing such
proposals by Judge Henry Friendly, Judge Cardozo, and then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg);
Frost, supra note ___, at 24 (discussing these proposals); Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R.
Wheeler, A Mechanism for “Statutory Housekeeping”: Appellate Courts Working with
Congress, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 131, 140 (2007) (discussing project to make
Legislative Counsel in House and Senate more aware of basic rules and principles when
drafting legislation); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1417 (1987).
68
See, e.g., Shobe, supra note ___, at 818-51.
69
For example, Professor Eskridge has argued that the drawing of inferences from
legislative inaction can be justified by reference to principles of public notice and reliance.
Eskridge, Inaction, supra note ___, at 108 (“[W]hat the Court is doing in these cases is to
place upon Congress the institutional burden of responding to ‘building block’ agency and
judicial interpretations of statutes when Congress disagrees with them.”). Similarly,
Professor Buzbee has argued that the “one-Congress fiction” might be justified by “the
Court’s obligation to make sense of the corpus juris.” Buzbee, supra note ___, at 193.
70
Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note ___, at 961.
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In this sense, none of the positions described so far really amounts to a
defense of the assumption of omniscience itself. Only a few commentators
have taken this rather more radical position. One way to defend the
assumption directly is to describe it as no more descriptively inaccurate than
any of the other assumptions lawyers and judges routinely make in applying
legal texts and attributing motivation to actors. Professors Moglen and
Pierce’s 1990 article contains the most elaborate articulation of this position
to date.71 As Parts II through IV will show, I am sympathetic to this view
but believe it can be presented even more convincingly. One problem with
the argument presented by Professors Moglen and Pierce is that it bears the
now-discredited marks of simplified poststructuralism circa 1990, a
theoretical attitude that no longer commands much respect. Indeed, one
could see the differences between the positions of Professors Moglen and
Pierce, on the one hand,72 and Professors Gluck and Bressman, as well as
Jarrod Shobe, on the other, as a portrait in miniature of changing fashions in
legal interdisciplinarity from 1990 to 2014, a turn from humanities-oriented
to social science–oriented models for arguments about legal method.
C. Current Debates
In recent years, scholarship on statutory interpretation, like many other
areas of legal scholarship, has taken an empirical turn. Some especially
prominent recent examples of this vein of scholarship bear directly on the
topic of this Article: what we can and cannot assume to be known to the
generators of statutory language. In two articles in the Stanford Law
Review, Professors Gluck and Bressman report on their survey of 137
71

Moglen & Pierce, supra note ___, at 1208 (“[S]ometimes it is necessary for us to
create fictive contexts . . . to understand complex and ambiguous events.”); id. at 1208-09
(“These contextualizing stories about the world are what we mean by the phrase
‘interpretive fictions.’ Interpretive fictions are conventionalized descriptions that make
communication comprehensible by providing a common basis for the social process of
interpretation. Many if not most interpretive fictions recount a stylized view of the speaker
or main participant.”); id. at 1217 (“Fiction is a response to the indeterminacy problem: if
we cannot ascertain the actual facts that lie behind words, we can at least agree on a story
about the origin of those words that permits consistent interpretation under most
circumstances.”). See also, e.g., Brudney, Chatter, supra note ___, at 81-82 (“Discerning
motivation or attributing collective understanding, based on a record that documents oral as
well as written statements, is a traditional judicial function that competent and fair-minded
judges should be expected to perform.”).
72
See, e.g., Moglen & Pierce, supra note ___, at 1216 (“The practical obstacles to
determining the reality of the legislative process . . . are merely a clue to the deeper
intractability of the enterprise resulting from the inherent indeterminacy of the
historiographic process itself.”).
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legislative drafters in the federal Congress; in the Columbia Law Review,
Jarrod Shobe places some of their conclusions in question, based on his own
set of interviews and personal experience in the federal Office of
Legislative Counsel. This Part explores the extent to which these recent
interventions do and do not shed light on the subject of this Article.
Both studies presume that the knowledge and intentions of the actual
drafters of legislation do and should matter to judicial practices. Both
studies indicate that this knowledge matters because courts make reference
to it in their explanations of their activity with respect to statutes.73 One key
point argued by Professors Gluck and Bressman is that the most general
standard model of judicial attitudes toward the legislature in the statutoryinterpretation context—what Gluck and Bressman call, following standard
practice, the “faithful agent” model, under which the court’s role is to
effectuate what the legislature has signaled it wants done—cannot justify
many judicial practices. 74 This is so, they contend, because that model
assumes facts about the making of statutes that in many cases do not match
reality.
Professors Gluck and Bressman conclude that courts and
commentators should develop new justifications for those judicial practices
that do not reflect drafters’ understandings of the legislative process or that
drafters simply do not consider optimal, and that if courts and
commentators cannot develop such justifications, courts should stop
engaging in the practices.75 The practices falling into this category include
several of the most popular canons typically linked to assumptions of
legislative omniscience, including the presumption of consistent usage.76
73

One could see Gluck and Bressman as more narrowly critiquing the textualist
“disciplinary” justification for the use of text-focused canons, but they do not seem to
regard their goal as limited in this way. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note ___, at 951
(noting that “judges rarely justify their use of canons as entirely unrelated to congressional
practice—no doubt because such justifications are difficult to reconcile with the faithfulagent paradigm . . . and the related desire not to appear ‘activist.’”).
74
Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note ___, at 907 (“[I]n light of our findings, the
faithful-agent model seems incapable of bearing the full weight of modern interpretive
practice.”).
75
They note that some canons not endorsed by drafters may be justified on rule-of-law
grounds—by courts’ obligation to impose coherence on the law—but note that this
justification is weakened by courts’ irregular use of canons. Gluck & Bressman, Part I,
supra note ___, at 962 (“[W]e do not believe that judges are successfully applying the
current interpretive regime to advance rule of law goals.”).
76
Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note ___, at 955-56 (noting that, “in the context of
both the rule against superfluities and the whole act and whole code rules, one might
imagine continued application of these canons in those limited circumstances in which one
can confirm that they do approximate drafting reality”); Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra
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This argument absorbs the standard critique of assumptions of legislative
omniscience described above, and extends that critique by applying it to a
greater number of practices, as well as by providing new data supporting the
claim of descriptive inaccuracy. But like those earlier criticisms, it is
basically a concern about basing judicial practices on suppositions that are
descriptively inaccurate.
Without targeting assumptions of omniscience explicitly, Professors
Gluck and Bressman hint at their awareness of the double fictionality of that
assumption; they note that the traditional justifications for many canons
assume not only an omniscient drafter but also a single “type[] of
omniscient drafter.”77 Their second article stresses the fragmented character
of the drafting process, in which different types of staffers have input at
different stages into different aspects of a draft, and often do not
communicate with staffers working on other aspects of the draft or other
drafts.78 As a result, Professors Gluck and Bressman concede that it might
not be possible to sum up in a compact legal theory, in any descriptively
accurate way, “the kind of staff, process and structural variety” that in fact
characterize the legislative process.79 Given all these problems with the
canons—problems that have, after all, been pointed out for decades, if not
always supported so devastatingly—why do judges continue to insist on
assuming a posture of faithful agency (or, in the terms with which this
note ___, MS at 51, 52, 54 (noting that “presumptions of consistent usage . . . [and] the rule
against superfluities . . . seem ripe for elimination if a drafting-based model [of
justification] is the goal”).
77
Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note ___, MS at 11-12 (“This is a bigger point
than the common notion that the ‘omniscient’ drafter assumption is a fiction. Even
assuming an omniscient drafter exists, there are simply too many categories of different
types of omniscient drafters to make general assumptions across them.”).
78
Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note ___, MS at 17-19 (discussing this problem
within Offices of Legislative Counsel), 21-22 (same with respect to congressional
committee staffers’ knowledge and jurisdiction). They acknowledge that Legislative
Counsel are aware of legal context, including judicial decisions, other statutes, and
interpretive principles, but stress the limits of this awareness due to the “siloing” of
Legislative Counsel. Id. at 17-19 (noting that 11 of 28 Legislative Counsel interviewed
opined that the specialization of Legislative Counsel is “an impediment to consistent usage
across statutes involving different subjects or different committees.”).
79
Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note ___, MS at 10; see also id. at 11 (“[A] theory
based on how Congress drafts may be impossible to accomplish.”); id. at 49 (querying how
valuable it would be to reground interpretive principles on actual practice “when much of
what is uncovered [about actual practice] is too complex or otherwise impossible for
doctrine to absorb,” e.g., “information about individual staff reputations” that is important
to drafting choices); id. at 52-53 (making similar point about knowledge of committee
jurisdiction and history).
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Article is concerned, making any assumptions about what legislators do or
do not know)? On this point, as suggested above, Professors Gluck and
Bressman appear to agree with Judge Posner: courts do this because they
fear being seen as “lawmakers” rather than “law appliers.”80
Jarrod Shobe’s recent article challenges some of these points, while
agreeing with others. Shobe argues that drafters are more aware of many of
the canons, and other matters regarding which courts impute knowledge to
them, than accounts like that of Professors Gluck and Bressman allow.
Specific canons depending on assumptions of omniscience, such as the
“whole act” rule, the rule against implied repeals, and the in pari materia
rule, may be based on accurate assumptions about drafters’ knowledge of
other statutes and other parts of an enactment.81 Shobe does not go so far as
to claim that assumptions of legislative omniscience are factually accurate.
He grants that the information known to drafters is distributed across
multiple individuals. 82 He acknowledges that drafters do not always share
information when multiple legislators are working on parallel proposals.83
And he does not claim that drafters can always anticipate scenarios in which
the language they draft may be ambiguous.84 Nevertheless, Shobe’s
account shares important features with that of Professors Gluck and
Bressman. Like them, he assumes that descriptive accuracy about drafters’
knowledge and intentions is an appropriate goal (indeed, he embraces this
goal more unequivocally than Professors Gluck and Bressman do). His
conclusions differ from theirs only in the match he perceives between
judicial imputations of knowledge and reality: he contends that drafters are,
if not omniscient, at least more aware than cynics claim.
This debate comes down to disagreement over how descriptively
inaccurate assumptions of omniscience (and other related assumptions
80

Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note ___, MS at 47-48 (“The pull of th[e] faithfulagent premise derives from the persistent discomfort that judges have in admitting
‘lawmaking’ in the statutory context. . . .”).
81
Shobe, supra note ___, at 856-60 (noting, inter alia, that “[a] modern statute . . . is
generally drafted by a group of drafters who are aware of the contents of the entire statute,”
and concluding that “judges should use these canons with greater confidence when
interpreting modern statutes”).
82
Shobe, supra note ___, at 842 (“[A]ttorneys in ALD are especially responsible for
providing analysis of case law and constitutional issues, while legislative counsel are
especially attuned to how laws fit in to the current statutory scheme.”).
83
Shobe, supra note ___, at 828-29.
84
Shobe, supra note ___, at 872-75 (noting that this type of ambiguity of application,
which Shobe calls “dynamic ambiguity,” “is impossible to eradicate”).
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about legislators’ and drafters’ mental states) are. All parties seem to accept
that, to be justified, imputations of omniscience to the legislature should be
at least approximately descriptively accurate. Neither side directly takes on
the older, legal realist–influenced critique of legislative personification;
these commentators do touch on the problem, but they cast it in terms of
institutional design and information management rather than category
confusion or telepathy. Absorbing and deeply illuminating as they are,
neither of these two recent accounts considers whether assumptions of
omniscience might be justifiable on grounds other than descriptive
accuracy. The rest of this Article explores resources and arguments that
suggest they can, with a focus on accounts of similar unrealistic mentalstate attributions outside the law (Part II) and elsewhere in the law (Part III).
II. WHAT WE (DON’T) KNOW ABOUT LEGAL FICTIONS
Commentators sometimes express their concern with the descriptive
inaccuracy of assumptions of legislative omniscience by labeling the
assumptions “fictions.”85 In this way, critics of these assumptions can draw
on the connotations of illegitimacy that the “fiction” label has long carried
in Anglo-American law, often without any further implications. 86 As the
author of a 2002 Harvard Law Review student note put it, “the term ‘legal
fiction’ has . . . . become nothing more than a catchphrase used casually to
dismiss particular falsities in the law.”87
As this quote suggests and as Part II.A will explain, calling assumptions
of omniscience “fictions” does not materially advance our understanding of
85

See, e.g., Note, Lessons from Abroad: Mathematical, Poetic, and Literary Fictions
in the Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2228, 2249 (2002) [hereinafter Lessons from Abroad]
(“Regardless of the reasons for the decline of th[e] old debate [over ‘substantive legal
fictions’], it is still early in the debates over the interpretive . . . fictions [e.g., fictions of
legislative omniscience]. These [fictions] . . . are more subtle and more sophisticated . . .,
but it is precisely for these reasons that [they] are potentially more dangerous.”).
86
Although criticism of legal fictions predates him, Jeremy Bentham still epitomizes
this attitude. Bentham abhorred legal fictions: “[I]n English law, fiction is a syphilis,
which runs in every vein, and carries into every part of the system the principle of
rottenness.” Jeremy Bentham, The Elements of the Art of Packing, in 5 WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 92 (J. Bowring ed., 1843). See also C.K. OGDEN, BENTHAM’S THEORY OF
FICTIONS (1932); Oliver R. Mitchell, The Fictions of the Law: Have They Proved Useful
or Detrimental to Its Growth?, 8 HARV. L. REV. 249, 250 (1893); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg,
Bentham’s Theory of Fictions—A “Curious Double Language,” 11 CARDOZO STUD. L. &
LITERATURE 223 (1999) (explaining the relationship between Bentham’s theory of legal
fictions and his broader theory of linguistic fictions).
87
Lessons from Abroad, supra note ___, at 2249.
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them—but this result is due more to the deficiencies of our recent thinking
about legal fictions that anything else. With only a few partial exceptions,
legal scholarship has treated legal fictions as unrelated to, or at least
different in kind from, other types of “fiction” that people generate and use.
The work on legal fictions has accordingly been largely inattentive to work
on fictions and fictionalizing in other disciplines—notably philosophy,
cognitive science, and literary studies—done over the past twenty-five
years. 88 Part II.B considers some conclusions of this non-legal work that
bear on the subject of this Article.
A. Legal Fictions
Most legal commentators—though not all—agree about the defining
characteristics of legal fictions. As this part will explain, however, those
agreed-upon characteristics are oddly limited, do not seem to explain how
lawyers and laypeople persistently use the term, and add up to an anemic
portrait of legal fictions that fails to justify the negative connotations
attached to the term. While scholarship on legal fictions does provide some
useful concepts for thinking about and evaluating the assumptions described
in Part I, it leaves just as many questions unanswered.
1. Legal Fiction Orthodoxy
Over more than two centuries of Anglo-American writing on legal
fictions, two components of the classic definition have remained largely
unchanged. First, virtually everyone agrees that fiction is distinct from
deceptive falsehood. Both fiction and falsehood involve departures from
truth, but a fiction’s lack of descriptive accuracy is known, not concealed.89
88

Counterexamples include Lessons from Abroad, supra note ___; Moglen & Pierce,
supra note ___; Stolzenberg, supra note ___; and Simon Gawthorne, Fictionalising
Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Strong Legal Fictionalism, 38 AUSTRALIAN J. OF LEGAL
PHIL. 52 (2013), discussed infra note ___.
89
Jeremy Bentham defined the term in this way: “By fiction, in the sense in which it
is used by lawyers, understand a false assertion of a privileged kind, . . . which, though
acknowledged to be false, is at the same time argued from, and acted upon, as if true.”
Jeremy Bentham, Continental Code, 9 WORKS 77-78 (J. Bowring ed., 1843), reprinted in
OGDEN, supra note ___, at cxvi. An 1893 article in the Harvard Law Review quotes Best
on Evidence and Presumptions as defining a fiction as “a rule of law which assumes as
true, and will not allow to be disproved, something which is false, but not impossible.”
Mitchell, supra note ___, at 252. Lon Fuller provided a largely parallel account in 1930,
defining a legal fiction as either “(1) a statement propounded with a complete or partial
consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility.” LON
FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967). See also, e.g., K. Scott Hamilton, Prolegomenon to
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Although commentators agree on this feature of legal fictions, however—
fictions involve some mutually understood departure from “truth”—there
has been little agreement about exactly what kind of things merit the “legal
fiction” label, that is, whether a legal fiction is a concept or thought, a
proposition of fact (a reference to a state of affairs in the world), a linguistic
formulation, or something more like a legal rule.90
The second widely accepted feature of legal fictions concerns their
purpose. The classic account in English-language commentary is that legal
fictions are a way for judges to adapt law to new and unforeseen
circumstances: legal fictions allow this by letting a judge (and the parties)
pretend the facts of a case are other than what they are.91 A corollary of this
point would seem to be that fictions are necessary only when such
adaptation is necessary; if the legal rules themselves are changed to
accommodate circumstances appropriately, fictions are no longer needed

Myth and Fiction in Legal Reasoning, Common Law Adjudication and Critical Legal
Studies, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1449, 1452 (1989) (“[A] legal fiction is an analytical device in
which a court recognizes the falsity of a particular proposition, but consciously treats the
proposition as true in its reasoning.”); Eben Moglen, Legal Fictions and Common Law
Legal Theory: Some Historical Reflections, 10 TEL AVIV UNIV. STUD. L. 33, 35-36 (1990)
(“A legal fiction is a proposition . . ., which rests in whole or in part on factual premises
known to be inaccurate. . . .”).
90
Pierre J.J. Olivier, author of the most comprehensive recent treatment of legal
fictions (one that addresses European as well as Anglo-American approaches), canvasses
the variations and argues that the label should be applied only to factual propositions used
as premises for legal reasoning, not to rules or statements of other kinds. See PIERRE J.J.
OLIVIER, LEGAL FICTIONS IN PRACTICE AND LEGAL SCIENCE 35 (1975) (“[I]t is wrong to
say [as Fuller does] that a fiction is a statement: a fiction is an assumption, a process of
thought which may be subsequently expressed as a statement, but it is not in the first place
a statement.”).
91
Sir Henry Maine was a prominent advocate of this position. See HENRY SUMNER
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 21-22 (1861) (“I . . . employ the expression ‘Legal Fiction’ to
signify any assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has
undergone alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, its operation being modified.”). See
also Mitchell, supra note ___, at 262 (“The only use and purpose . . . of any legal fiction is
to nominally conceal this fact that the law has undergone a change at the hands of
judges.”); OLIVIER, supra note ___, at 89-90 (“Anglo-American jurists see [concealment of
the fact that ‘a judicial decision is not in harmony with the existing law’] as the main
function of the fiction in law.”). Olivier is critical of Anglo-American writers for
“concentrat[ing] exclusively on one aspect [of legal fictions], viz. that the fiction
conceals . . . the fact that a judge is allowed, under cloak of the fiction, to ‘change’ the law.
[This] represents a one-sided view of the function of the legal fiction. . . . [L]egal fictions
are not only employed by judges, but by legislators and legal scientists.” OLIVIER, supra
note ___, at 36.
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and become objectionable.92
Consensus on these two points in Anglo-American writing has not
contributed to agreement on other aspects of the phenomenon. Work on
legal fictions has had a frustrating tendency to develop a new set of
principles and a new framework for classification with each new study.93
These taxonomies have not built on one another, so instead of an
increasingly elaborated framework we have a proliferation of overlapping
ones. In the mid-nineteenth century, Sir Henry Maine described legal
fictions as themselves just one of three basic kinds of devices for legal
change and adjustment to new circumstances, the other two being equity
and legislation. 94 On Maine’s account, legal fictions were the most
primitive such device, tending to be supplanted by equity and then by
legislation as a legal system matures. But later writers did not necessarily
perceive legal fictions as competing with legislation in this way. In 1893,
for example, Oliver Mitchell classed legal fictions in three categories: the
first two involve judicial assertions of unproven facts for purposes of
applying a legal rule, like Maine’s understanding of legal fictions, while the
third comprises what Mitchell calls “[f]ictions of relation,”95 or fictions
involving imputation or deeming, something that could occur pursuant to a
legislative act.96 Then, in the early 1930s, Lon Fuller classed the legal
fictions that Maine, Mitchell, and other legal writers had focused on as
“fictions of legal technique,”97 contrasting them with “jurisprudential
fictions” (Hans Vaihinger, Fuller’s inspiration on this point, called these

92

Countless examples of this position, which was especially strongly articulated by
Hans Vaihinger, exist. See, e.g., HANS VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ‘AS IF’: A
SYSTEM OF THE THEORETICAL, PRACTICAL, AND RELIGIOUS FICTIONS OF MANKIND 12-13,
98 (1911; C.K. Ogden trans., 1924); James B. Stoneking, Penumbras and Privacy: A Study
of the Use of Fictions in Constitutional Decision-Making, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 859, 865-66
(1985) (“A fiction’s status as a temporary measure seemingly calls for its eventual
removal.”).
93
See OLIVIER, supra note ___, at 18 (“After [Dutch author T.] Boey [in a 1773 legal
dictionary published in the Netherlands], all remembrance of the definition and of the
elements of the fiction concept seems [sic] to have sunk into oblivion. Jurists seem to be
struggling to define and analyse the fiction ab novo.”).
94
Maine, supra note ___, at 20.
95
Mitchell, supra note ___, at 253.
96
Examples described by Mitchell include imputing an act to someone who did not
perform it and deeming an act to have occurred in a particular location or at a particular
time. Mitchell, supra note ___, at 255.
97
FULLER, supra note ___, at 130. Fuller originally published the essays later
republished as FULLER, supra note ___, in the Illinois Law Review in 1930 and 1931.
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“theoretical fictions”).98
These commentators, and others, agreed on basic points—that fictions
are distinct from falsehoods, that judges sometimes use them to reach just
results where the law seems outmoded or too restrictive—but overall, their
work did not generate any clear agenda for either legal reform or
scholarship. In the years since Fuller’s book of essays was published, legal
academics have only occasionally addressed this topic, usually arguing that
legal fictions are still objectionable, basically for the reasons articulated by
Bentham (that is, because they do not correspond to anything in the real
world).99 Much less often, legal academics have argued that fictions are a
permanent feature of legal discourse and do not deserve their negative
reputation.100 Both perspectives are unsatisfactory: the critique of legal
fictions has trouble explaining the persistence of constructs that we keep
calling by that name, other than by reference to persistent judicial bad faith,
and the defenses of legal fictions, most of which date to the 1980s, have had
difficulty doing justice to the unambiguous connection we demand between
legal discourse and real life (a demand exemplified by the work discussed
in Part I.C). This orthodox framework, such as it is, also fails to resolve, or
98

FULLER, supra note ___, at 4. This category Fuller further subdivided into
“exploratory fictions,” which let judges “feel their way incrementally toward some new
legal principle or theory,” and “abbreviatory fictions,” used “primarily for the purpose of
expounding existing legal doctrine,” among which Fuller included the concepts of
corporate personhood and constructive notice. Id. at 82. On Vaihinger’s influence on
Fuller, see Karen Petroski, Legal Fictions and the Limits of Legal Language, 9 INT’L J. OF
LAW IN CONTEXT 485 (2013).
99
See, e.g., Louise Harmon, Falling off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of
Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1990) (focusing on particular example of a
“dangerous legal fiction”); P. Smith, supra note ___, at 1495; Lessons from Abroad, supra
note ___, at 2249. Cf. Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 1, 20-23 (2010) (arguing that “empirical legal errors”—assertions made by courts
that are descriptively inaccurate—should not be considered legal fictions because they do
not fit Fuller’s model).
100
See Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871, 915 (1986) (“In
law, to work with words may mean to be caught continuously in the act of creating legal
fictions.”); R.A. Samek, Fictions and the Law, 31 U. TORONTO L.J. 290 (1981); Moglen,
supra note ___, at 38 (arguing that because of common-law courts’ responsibilities with
respect to the partitioning of factual and legal questions, “the legal fiction as a trope of
common-law thought is chronically persistent”). Olivier acknowledges this type of
argument repeatedly, but does not agree with it. See, e.g., OLIVIER, supra note ___, at 47
(“[T]he wide interpretation of the word fiction, to include all abstract notions . . ., must be
rejected. . . . [T]he wide concept of fiction is based on a very naïve concept of reality. . . .
If all abstract notions were fictions, the concept of reality, being an abstract notion, must
itself be a fiction, making it difficult to argue about ‘reality’ or to classify some entities as
‘real’ and others as ‘unreal’ or ‘fictitious.’”).
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to suggest a way to resolve, many of the puzzles raised by assumptions of
omniscience and described in Part I.
2. How Fictions of Omniscience Fit In
The consensus framework for discussing legal fictions does not do
much to help us understand the assumptions of omniscience described in
Part I. Those assumptions do not seem to fit the classical model; even if
one selects just a single framework, assumptions of legislative omniscience
have a tendency to fall between categories, and these assumptions have
features that the classic account of fictions simply makes no mention of.101
For one thing, although judges very likely wield these assumptions with
awareness of their untruth, it does not seem that judges make the
assumptions in order to adjust legal rules to unanticipated circumstances.
The assumptions are not stand-ins for facts that would otherwise be
susceptible to processes of legal proof.102 Thus, they are not “practical”
fictions, to use Vaihinger’s and Fuller’s classification scheme. Moreover,
while commentators sometimes suggest that these assumptions might once
have been useful, but can now safely be discarded,103 courts do not seem to
conceive of these assumptions as only temporarily useful. Yet assumptions
of legislative omniscience are not exactly “theoretical” fictions either, at
least not as described by commentators on statutory interpretation. 104 The
101

Cf. P. Smith, supra note ___, at 1461-63 (arguing that interpretive canons are based
on “new” legal fictions).
102
See, e.g., Moglen & Pierce, supra note ___, at 1209 (explaining that classic “‘legal
fictions’ operate by . . . presuming the facts of lawsuits rather than by explicit amendment
of the rules of law that would otherwise apply. . . .”).
103
Professors Gluck and Bressman, for example, suggest that fictions underlying
interpretive practices might have arisen due to the immaturity of understandings of
statutory interpretation: “One way to understand the past seventy years of universalizing
doctrinal and theoretical work [in the field of statutory interpretation] is as the foundational
work necessary to establish a field. Our findings raise the possibility that the recent focus
on legislation . . . is only a temporary stop along the way to a more nuanced . . .
understanding. . . .’” Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note ___, MS at 71. See also Cass
Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1247, 1256 (1990) (“[A]n important
contribution of twentieth-century jurisprudence has been a measure of self-consciousness
about the existence of legal fictions, and an understanding that they are obstacles to
thought. We do not need interpretive fictions. Instead we need interpretive principles—
ones that can be defended in substantive or institutional terms.”). Olivier also takes this
position. See, e.g., OLIVIER, supra note ___, at 107 (“A fiction should be a symptom
signalising an unsolved problem, and we should be prepared to solve the problem and find
the truth rather than to perpetuate the fiction.”).
104
They might be “theoretical fictions” as they are used by courts. Olivier describes
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standard position on theoretical fictions is, following Vaihinger, that they
are useful and even necessary devices for purposes of analysis and
discussion of complex matters (akin to scientific and economic models).105
But commentators identify assumptions of legislative omniscience as
inadequate premises for certain interpretive practices.
That is,
commentators impute these assumptions to courts as theoretical
presuppositions that are inaccurate and therefore should not be presupposed
by courts. Why do commentators impute them to courts, then? The classic
approach to legal fictions makes it difficult to answer this question without
cynically assuming that commentators are, consciously or not, constructing
a straw man for use in broader critiques of judicial practice.
The standard account of legal fictions also does not provide much
guidance on how to handle the precise contrary-to-fact assumptions
involved in fictions of legislative omniscience. Is the key problem with
these assumptions the imputation of an impossible mental state, the
imputation of that impossible mental state to an inconceivable agent, the
compounding of contrary-to-fact suppositions involved, two or more of
these problems, or something else entirely?106 Modern work on legal
fictions gives us no tools for addressing these questions (or those raised by
the analogous fictions described in Part III).107
Avoiding all of these issues, commentators who call these assumptions
“fictions” have not generally explained use of that label by reference to the
legal accounts of legal fictions. Rather, commentators seem to use the label
“theoretical fictions” as not used not only by commentators but by lawyers and judges.
OLIVIER, supra note ___, at 156 (“All jurists . . . practice legal science whenever they
examine, analyse and explain the law. . . . I regard a fiction as theoretical when it is used to
analyse or explain the law. It is . . . not a fiction in law, but a fiction concerning the law. It
is often difficult to distinguish between practical and theoretical fictions.”) But applying
this label to the assumptions does not explain the theoretical consensus regarding their
inappropriateness.
105
See, e.g., OLIVIER, supra note ___, at 87, 91-93.
106
When they have acknowledged these different contrary-to-fact assumptions,
commentators have tended to treat them as equivalently problematic (because all
descriptively inaccurate) without further analysis. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note ___, at
234; P. Smith, supra note ___, at 1460-65.
107
Medieval European commentators writing on legal fictions distinguished between
fictions concerning possible states of affairs and fictions concerning impossible states of
affairs, and condemned only the latter. See OLIVIER, supra note ___, at 15, 16 (describing
these positions); Ian Maclean, Legal Fictions and Fictional Entities in Medieval
Jurisprudence, 20:3 LEGAL HIST. 1, 9, 12 (1999). Modern practice treats legal fictions as
equally defensible or indefensible, whether or not the untrue facts they posit are possible.
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for rhetorical effect—it allows them to appeal to the accumulated
connotations of the “fiction” term as referring to devices that undermine
law’s search for the truth,108 that allow judges to assume a stance of
passivity, 109 and that are not necessary in an enlightened, non-primitive
legal system. 110 It does not necessarily follow, however, that the label is
inaccurate. Perhaps the mismatch between the classic account of legal
fictions and the ways these assumptions of legislative omniscience operate
stems from an inadequate conceptualization of legal fictions themselves.
Given that this conceptualization has not significantly changed since the
early twentieth century, it might well be susceptible to improvement.
B. Other Approaches to Fiction
The possibility that the classic approach to legal fictions might be
deficient is supported by the fact that other disciplines have developed far
more robust theories of fiction over the past quarter century—almost
entirely since the last wave of scholarly defenses of legal fictions in the
1980s. With very few exceptions,111 no recent writing on fictions for legal
audiences has taken any account of this work. This section examines some
of its key features and conclusions.112
1. Philosophers on Fictional Utterances and Attitudes

108

See, e.g., P. Smith, supra note ___, at 1480-89 (discussing value of judicial candor).
See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, Part II, supra note ___, at 47-48; Lessons from
Abroad, supra note ___, at 2232-33 (2002) (“[T]he legal fiction [is traditionally
characterized as] wield[ing] a deceptive power that allow[s] judges to assume a legislative
function.”); OLIVIER, supra note ___, at 90 (“It is argued that the use of fictions
undermines respect for the law insamuch as fictions portray it as being devious and
deceptive.”).
110
Lessons from Abroad, supra note ___, at 2232 (noting that in the nineteenth
century, “[m]any denounced the legal fiction as a crude and anachronistic device that had
outlived its usefulness”).
111
See, e.g., Simon Stern, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Third Person, 16 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 364 (2013); Gawthorne, supra note ___ (discussed at more length infra note
___); Stolzenberg, supra note ___.
112
Major works include, but are not limited to, KENDALL L. WALTON, MIMESIS AS
MAKE-BELIEVE: ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIONAL ARTS (1990);
GREGORY CURRIE, THE NATURE OF FICTION (1990); AMIE THOMASSON, FICTION AND
METAPHYSICS (1999); SHAUN NICHOLS & STEPHEN P. STICH, MINDREADING: AN
INTEGRATED ACCOUNT OF PRETENCE, SELF-AWARENESS, AND UNDERSTANDING OTHER
MINDS (2003); LISA ZUNSHINE, WHY WE READ FICTION: THEORY OF MIND AND THE
NOVEL (2006); and BRIAN BOYD, ON THE ORIGIN OF STORIES: E VOLUTION, COGNITION,
AND FICTION (2009).
109
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At least since the early twentieth century, philosophers of language and
mind have been debating the status of the referents of fictional statements—
the question of whether or not fictional characters exist, and if they do, in
what sense they exist.113 This question is closely related to the question of
whether statements that we know to be fictional can nevertheless be said to
be “true,” and if so, in what sense they can be said to be true. A puzzle
addressed by many writing in this tradition is the natural tendency most of
us would have to say that, for example, the sentence “Sherlock Holmes
lived at 221B Baker Street” is true, even though it refers to a fictional
character and his fictional residence. Since around 1990, such concerns
have again become a topic of acute philosophical interest.
As this framing of the central issues suggests, most philosophers have
focused on individual propositions, not entire fictional works.114 This focus
seems artificial when compared with our everyday experiences with
fictional narratives, but it makes the philosophical work easy to translate to
the legal context, since legal fictions in their classic form also take the form
of propositions rather than extended narratives. As philosophers have
pursued answers to the questions noted above, they have generally agreed
that those answers must be able to handle three different types of statements
about fictional entities, and that the answers may need to be different for
each type. 115 One type of statement is the kind exemplified in the previous
paragraph, which Gregory Currie has called a “fictive utterance.” 116 A
second is a statement that compares fictional entities across fictions, such as
“Sherlock Holmes was more of a tortured genius than Hercule Poirot was”;
Currie calls these “transfictive” utterances.117 And the third is the type of
statement that comments on the fiction’s relation to reality; “Sherlock
Holmes was a great fictional character” is an example of such a
113

The origins of this debate are usually traced to Bertrand Russell, On Denoting, 14
MIND 473 (1905), and ALEXIUS MEINONG, ÜBER GEGENSTANDSTHEORIE (1904). For
useful overviews, see CHARLES CRITTENDEN, UNREALITY: THE METAPHYSICS OF
FICTIONAL OBJECTS (1991); Fred Kroon & Alberto Voltolini, Fiction, STANFORD
ENCYLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (July 2011), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
fiction/.
114
The work of Kendall Walton and Stacie Friend is critical of this tendency. See
WALTON, supra note ___, at 88-89; Stacie Friend, Fictive Utterance and Imagining II, 85
PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 163, 175 (2011) (“[W]e should consider, not how the
parts of the work add up to the whole, but instead how the whole work is embedded in a
larger context: in particular, the practices of reading, writing, publishing, and so on.”).
115
See especially CURRIE, supra note ___, at 30-33.
116
CURRIE, supra note ___, at 171-72.
117
CURRIE, supra note ___, at 171-72.
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“metafictive” utterance.118
The most obvious features of these examples are that (1) it seems
reasonable to say that each could be evaluated for its truth or falsity, and
(2) evaluating the truth or falsity of each must be done from within a
different frame of reference: the fictional narratives of Conan Doyle for the
fictive utterance, the narratives of Conan Doyle plus those of Christie for
the transfictive utterance, and the world in which Conan Doyle and Christie
wrote their narratives (and in which the narratives are read) for the
metafictive utterance. Philosophers have proposed a number of ways of
evaluating the truth of these different types of statements;119 what is
important for purposes of this Article is simply the observation that
statements referring to fictional things and people fall into multiple
categories, and the categories do not correspond to those typically proposed
by writers on legal fictions. This observation in turn suggests the possibility
of augmenting the classic legal account by considering the internal logic of
particular legal fictions and those fictions’ relations to one another, as well
as the multiple frames of reference within which they are used.
A second major theme in philosophical work on fiction concerns the
necessity of considering the attitudes of those making and responding to
fictional statements in analyzing those statements. Often this concern is
discussed in terms of “pretense,” following influential early accounts by
John Searle and David Lewis.120 An especially popular account along these
118

CURRIE, supra note ___, at 172-73.
The standard account for fictive utterances is that of David Lewis, who proposed
that their truth could be assessed by reading them as “prefixed” by a phrase identifying
them as relative to a particular discursive context. David Lewis, Truth in Fiction, 15 AM.
PHIL. Q. 37, 38 (1978). For example, we would normally evaluate the truth of the
statement “Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street” by asking whether a human being by that
name did live on a real street with that name. But Lewis proposed that we could evaluate
the truth of that sentence by reference to the fiction in which the Sherlock Holmes
character appeared, for example by (perhaps silently) recasting the statement to read, “In
Conan Doyle’s stories about Sherlock Holmes, Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street,” and
then evaluating its truth by reference to the content of Conan Doyle’s stories, not living
human beings or actual streets. This approach allows us to say that the statement “Holmes
lived at 221B Baker Street” is true, even though it does not refer to any actual human
being, a result consistent with our habits of thinking and speaking about fictional
propositions. (This is only one element of Lewis’s approach, but it is the most widely
accepted element.)
120
In a 1975 essay, Searle argued that making a fictive utterance involves “pretending”
to assert something. John R. Searle, The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse, 6:2 NEW
LITERARY HIST. 319, 325-26 (1975). Lewis agreed that “[s]torytelling [i.e., the making of
statements about fictional people, places, and things] is pretense.” Lewis, supra note ___,
119
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lines, one that has been taken up by many non-philosophers, is Kendall
Walton’s account of fiction as “make-believe.” Walton describes fictional
works as “props” akin to those used by children in (nondeceptive) games of
pretend. Just as children make believe that, for example, a banana is a
telephone, and generate additional imaginary propositions and behavior on
the basis of their attitude toward that “prop,” so do older individuals use
fictional narratives and other representational artifacts (such as judicial
opinions and scholarly articles) as props in more complex and channeled
games of make-believe. 121 The wide appeal of Walton’s theory may be due
not only to its richness but also to the persuasiveness of his case for the
generative power of fiction, his emphasis on how these kinds of artifacts
open up new possibilities for thought and action. (Of course, the thought
and action such artifacts make possible is not always normatively desirable,
but this is a distinct point.) Walton’s focus on this aspect of fiction
contrasts dramatically with the attitude that older philosophical debates—
like most discussions of legal fictions—took toward fictional sentences as
impoverished or deficient (because not “really” referring) propositions.122
2. Cognitive Scientists on Fiction, Mindreading, and Metacognition
Among the disciplines in which Walton’s make-believe theory has had
considerable influence are psychology and cognitive science. Work on the
generation and processing of fictional or fictive utterances by real people in
these disciplines has also increased tremendously in volume over recent
decades. 123 Many areas of psychological research relate to issues studied
at 40.
121

WALTON, supra note ___, at 69.
A recent article by Simon Gawthorne is one of the only attempts by a legal scholar
to engage seriously with recent philosophical approaches to fiction. Gawthorne, supra note
___. Gawthorne argues that philosophical fictionalism can ground a more satisfactory
jurisprudence than traditional positivist and natural-law conceptions of the nature of law.
(Fictionalism is the position that fictional referents have value, but not truth value. See
R.M. SAINSBURY, FICTION AND FICTIONALISM 152 (2010).) According to Gawthorne,
“[f]ictionalising social ontology remains the only principled approach to explaining our
powers over institutional things,” such as law. Gawthorne, supra, at 58. Gawthorne does
not address particular legal fictions at any length, but focuses on legal discourse as a whole
as fictional: “It is suggested, both that there is a human capacity to maintain such a robust
fictional discourse of law and that this describes what actually occurs to varying degrees in
modern societies.” Gawthorne, supra, at 72.
123
See Alan Richardson, Defaulting to Fiction: Neuroscience Rediscovers the
Romantic Imagination, 32:4 POETICS TODAY 663, 663-64 (2011) (“[A]t the beginning of
the twenty-first century, imagination suddenly became a term to conjure with in the
sciences of brain and mind.”).
122
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under the fiction rubric in other fields, including investigations of play and
nondeceptive pretense in children, investigations of “mindreading” 124 and
empathy, and investigations of metacognition. 125
As the above brief discussion of Walton’s work suggested, the play
behavior that children spontaneously and nearly universally exhibit seems
to share a number of features with adult forms of pretense, including the
generation and appreciation of fictional representations in various media.
Cognitive scientists have added to this observation findings on the close
relationship between children’s pretense behavior and their ability to engage
in mindreading: to attribute desires, beliefs, and intentions to others; to
predict behavior based on those attributions; and to experience empathy.126
Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, seeking to summarize and reconcile
much of the research in this area, have proposed that a single set of
cognitive mechanisms is responsible for our abilities to pretend, to attribute
mental states to others, and to detect and report on our own mental states,
including our perceptions, our beliefs, and our inferences from those
beliefs. 127 These mechanisms—partly innate, and partly developed through
interactions with other individuals and artifacts—are crucial for navigating
complex social situations, coordinating behavior, trusting others, and
developing many specialized behavioral and cognitive skills. Notably, and
perhaps surprisingly, psychologists have found that we use the same
mechanisms to “read” the “minds” of (i.e., impute mental states to) nonhuman “characters,” like geometrical shapes, if they are placed in
124

See generally NICHOLS & STICH, supra note ___.
See, e.g., METACOGNITION: KNOWING ABOUT KNOWING (Arthur P. Shimamura &
Janet Metcalfe eds., 1991).
126
Work on processes of reader identification with characters explores the tendency of
readers to take up an “internal perspective” when reading narratives, “even when the
narrative does not specify any particular perspective” for the reader to assume. Raymond
A. Mar & Keith Oatley, The Function of Fiction Is the Abstraction and Simulation of
Social Experience, 3:3 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 173, 181 (2008); see also
Amy Coplan, Empathic Engagement with Narrative Fiction, 62:2 J. OF AESTHETICS & ART
CRITICISM 141, 146-48 (2004). From such observations, researchers have inferred that
reading fictional narratives helps readers develop “theory of mind”—an understanding that
others’ mental states differ from one’s own—and to parse social situations in terms of
motivation and expectations. See, e.g., Mar & Oatley, supra, at 173 (“[C]arefully crafted
literary stories are not flawed empirical accounts, but are . . . simulations of selves in the
social world. . . . The function of fiction can thus be seen to include the recording,
abstraction, and communication of complex social information, rendering it more
comprehensible than usual.”); David Comer Kidd & Emanuele Castano, Reading Literary
Fiction Improves Theory of Mind, 342 SCI. 377 (Oct. 18, 2013). This work has been
influential in recent literary scholarship.
127
See generally NICHOLS & STICH, supra note ___.
125
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rudimentary narrative contexts.128
Our ability to detect and report on our own mental states, or our
thinking and reasoning about our own thinking and reasoning, sometimes
receives the label “metacognition.” One aspect of metacognition not
touched on so far but relevant to the philosophical debates about fiction, as
well as to understanding legal fictions, is the skill known as “source
monitoring”: our ability to “tag” our beliefs according to the sources from
which we learned them. 129 Our facility at source monitoring explains the
ease with which we comprehend the differences between the kinds of fictive
utterances identified by Currie, as well as our handling of information from
a wide variety of sources in everyday life. Source monitoring allows us to
adjust our degree of commitment to various propositions or beliefs; we
might, for example, be willing to act on a friend’s assertion that it is raining
by dressing appropriately, without being willing to say that we have a firm
belief that it is, for a fact, raining, based on our assessment of the friend’s
reliability. Source monitoring is important to general social functioning but
also to many areas of specialized activity, such as legal practice.130
These paragraphs have only scratched the surface of the vast
psychological literature on the workings of imagination, pretense, and
fiction. The overall theme of this literature, however, is remarkably
128

Mar & Oatley, supra note ___, at 179 (noting studies that have shown that “humans
spontaneously ascribe intentional states to even simple circles and triangles when they
move in ways that look like chasing, fighting, and so on”) (citing, inter alia, G. Abell, F.
Happe, & U. Frith, Do Triangles Play Tricks? Attribution of Mental States to Animated
Shapes in Normal and Abnormal Development, 15 COG. DEV. 1 (2000)); see also Daniel
Schwarz, Character and Characterization: An Inquiry, 19:1 J. OF NARRATIVE TECHNIQUE
85, 90 (1989) (arguing that anthropomorphizing betrays an interest in human motivation
and other minds).
129
See Marcia K. Johnson, Shahin Hashtroudi, & D. Stephen Lindsay, Source
Monitoring, 114:1 PSYCH. BULL. 3, 3, 11-12, 13-14 (1993) (describing functions of source
monitoring).
130
Andrew Elfenbein has argued that expert reading allows a kind of “offline”
processing of routine components of text, which then become invisible to the reader, while
enabling more sophisticated processing of other textual components. Andrew Elfenbein,
Cognitive Science and the History of Reading, 121:2 PMLA 484, 485 (2006) (“The very
expertise of literary critics may render [some] aspects [of reading] invisible because their
skills have become so routinized. Far from leading to shallow or superficial results, such
routinization enables sophisticated . . . readings.”). Expert reading practices that involve
the differentiation and juggling of multiple sources may make the metacognitive workout
that reading provides more intense and effective. Id. at 498 (“The discipline of literary
criticism fosters metacognitive abilities by engaging with a remarkably wide range of
texts . . . which encourage the development of varied reading strategies.”).
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uniform. According to psychologists, pretense and fiction writing and
reading are independently valuable activities, not evasions of real-life
experience but useful additions to and tools for enhancing it. This generally
positive attitude toward pretending and fiction in recent cognitive science
has made that work especially attractive to scholars of literary fiction who
are seeking new ways to explain the worth of the artifacts they study and
the legitimacy of studying them.
3. Literary Scholars on the Elements and Significance of Omniscience
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, literary scholars have
increasingly incorporated psychological (and, to a lesser extent,
philosophical) approaches into their work. Cognitive scientists’ findings
have allowed literary scholars to argue that the activities of reading and
writing fiction develop important human capacities, including theory of
mind131 and metacognitive skills, 132 as well as empathy133 and the notion of
objective truth.134 Two lines of inquiry in literary scholarship relevant to
the subject of this Article have received less attention in philosophy and
131

ZUNSHINE, supra note ___, for example, argues generally that reading fiction is a
way to practice mindreading skills. Similarly, BOYD, supra note ___, describes art,
including fiction, as a form of “cognitive play,” id. at 16, that “speed[s] up our capacity to
process patterns of social information, [and] to make inferences from other minds,” id. at
49. See also Schwarz, supra note ___, at 90, 92, 100, 104 (arguing that characterization
implies an interpersonal or transpersonal attitude and offers training in theory of mind); H.
Porter Abbott, Reading Intended Meaning Where None Is Intended: A Cognitivist
Reappraisal of the Implied Author, 32:3 POETICS TODAY 461, 465, 467 (2011) (noting how
personification of an implied author meshes with “the illusion of wholeness that our ‘folk
psychology’ regularly confers upon the communicating self”); Murray Smith, On the
Twofoldness of Character, 42:2 NEW LITERARY HIST. 277, 277 (2011) (“[W]e can and do
respond to [literary] characters in ways that parallel our responses to real individuals.”).
132
See M. Smith, supra note ___, at 279-81, 283, 291 (discussing how perceptions of
character involve twofold recognition of a represented “person” and of the constructed or
“configurational” aspect of the representation); Vanessa L. Ryan, Reading the Mind: From
George Eliot’s Fiction to James Sully’s Psychology, 70:4 J. OF THE HIST. OF IDEAS 615
(2009) (describing how accounts of the value of reading fiction by nineteenth-century
psychologist James Sully anticipated twentieth-century cognitive science).
133
Empathy with characters is the chief mechanism by which fiction reading is thought
to develop theory-of-mind capacities. See, e.g., Richard Walsh, Why We Wept for Little
Nell: Character and Emotional Involvement, 5:3 NARRATIVE 306, 313 (1997) (arguing
that our emotional response to real people is analogous to our emotional response to
fictional characters); SUZANNE KEEN, EMPATHY AND THE NOVEL (2010).
134
See Rebecca Goldstein, The Fiction of the Self and the Self of Fiction, 47:2 MASS.
REV. 293 (2006) (arguing that practice in identifying with fictional points of view trains us
in assuming the attitude necessary to conceive of transpersonal and interpersonal truths).
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cognitive science: the fictional representation of impossible scenarios135
and the type of impossible representation we call “omniscience.”
One useful addition made by literary scholarship to both the
philosophical and the psychological work on fiction is an emphasis on the
relative irrelevance of verisimilitude to the experience of reading fiction. 136
A fantastic narrative, just like a realistic narrative, can be analyzed and
deliver benefits in all the ways described above.137 It is just as easy for
readers to empathize with characters presented by third-person narrators as
it is for them to empathize with first-person narrators.138 Readers can
empathize with, as well as attribute intention to, fictional figures who do not
resemble themselves, even “characters” that are not purporting to be
human. 139
A classic “impossible” device in Western literary fiction is what we
have come to know as the omniscient third-person narrator: the narrator
who tells us not only what the characters in the narrative did, but also what
was going on in their fictional minds.140 In an important 2004 essay that
135

Philosophers have tended to view “impossible” fictions as deviant forms of
reference. See Diane Proudfoot, Possible Worlds Semantics and Fiction, 35:1 AM. J. PHIL.
LOGIC 9, 31-32 (2006) (observing that “many philosophers take the view that impossible
fictions are peculiar or non-standard,” but that “[u]nfortunately for this view, many fictions
are impossible fictions”). What is conventionally called “omniscient narration,” Proudfoot
notes, is impossible in this sense: “Many nineteenth-century European and American
novels contain descriptions of the undisclosed thoughts of the characters and so are
paradigmatic cases of impossible fiction.” Proudfoot, supra, at 33.
136
See, e.g., Richardson, supra note ___, at 666-67 (noting the prevalence of
“impossibilities” in fiction, and observing, “virtually every known human culture features
popular oral tales and myths that indulge in similar impossibilities” to those found in
contemporary American popular culture, such as the Twilight series and the movie Avatar).
137
See especially Rick Busselle & Helena Bilandzic, Fictionality and Perceived
Realism in Experiencing Stories: A Model of Narrative Comprehension and Engagement,
18 COMMC’N THEORY 255, 256, 260, 266, 270-71 (2008) (making this point and noting the
impossible components of many otherwise “realistic,” or internally coherent, genre
narratives, such as crime dramas, mystery, and science fiction).
138
Suzanne Keen, Readers’ Temperaments and Fictional Character, 42:2 NEW
LITERARY HIST. 295, 302 (2011).
139
See Keen, 2011, supra note ___, at 297.
140
See, e.g., Paisley Livingston & Andrea Sauchelli, Philosophical Perspectives on
Fictional Characters, 42:2 POETICS TODAY 337, 354 (2011) (describing such a narrator as
an “impossible agent”). Brian Boyd argues that fictional figures who possess omniscience,
such as deities, serve a social-control function by causing us to postulate a figure who can
see into our minds. BOYD, supra note ___, at 204-05. Similarly, near the beginning of his
2004 essay, Jonathan Culler notes that the idea of omniscient narration seems to have
arisen from “the frequently articulated analogy between God and the author” of a work of
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sparked an extended debate, Jonathan Culler argued that this label is a
misnomer, and his analysis has informed some of the qualifications
presented earlier. 141 Culler considered “omniscience” an imprecise label for
narratorial features; it “conflates and confuses several different factors”
present in so-called omniscient narration, he argued.142 According to
Culler, these include (1) “the performative authoritativeness of many
narrative declarations, which seem to bring into being what they describe”;
(2) “the reporting of innermost thoughts and feelings, such as are usually
inaccessible to human observers”; (3) narrators’ occasional “flaunt[ing]” of
their “godlike ability to determine how things turn out”; and (4) “the
synoptic impersonal narration of the realist tradition,” or the selective
filtering of relevant information by conventional omniscient narrators.143
Culler surmised that the second of these functions is responsible for the
conventional “omniscience” label: when we read about what characters are
thinking from an apparently external perspective, he suggested, we are
inclined to “invent a person to be a source of textual details, but since this
knowledge is not that which an ordinary person could have, we must
imagine this invented person to be godlike, omniscient.”144 Culler’s
broader conclusions in this essay have not been widely accepted, perhaps
because they seem oblivious to the kinds of findings discussed in the
previous part; he did not succeed in getting critics to abandon the
“omniscient narrator” term.145
But Culler’s breakdown of the various features of omniscient narration
fiction, but Culler contents that we should understand the analogy to work the other way,
that is, that “the example of the novelist, who creates his world, . . . helps us to imagine the
possibility of a creator, a god, a sentient being, as undetectable to use as the novelist would
be to the characters who exist in the universe of the text this god created.” Culler, supra
note ___, at 23.
141
Culler, supra note ___. Responses to this essay included William Nelles,
Omniscience for Atheists, 14 NARRATIVE 118 (2006); Barbara K. Olson, “Who Thinks this
Book?” Or Why the Author/God Analogy Merits Our Continued Attention, 14 NARRATIVE
339 (2006); Jonathan Culler, Knowing or Creating? A Response to Barbara Olson, 14
NARRATIVE 347 (2006); Meir Sternberg, Omniscience in Narrative Construction, 28
POETICS TODAY 683 (2007).
142
Culler, supra note ___, at 22.
143
Culler, supra note ___, at 26.
144
Culler, supra note ___, at 28. Culler suggests, following Nicholas Royle, that we
should use the term “telepathy” rather than “omniscience” to refer to this phenomenon of
inside views of characters’ minds. Id. at 29 (citing and discussing NICHOLAS ROYLE, THE
UNCANNY 261 (2003)).
145
See, e.g., Paul Dawson, The Return of Omniscience in Contemporary Fiction, 17:2
NARRATIVE 143, 149 (2009); Abbott, supra note ___, at 466-68, 470, 477-78.
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is a very useful tool for analysis. Although Culler and his interlocutors
were discussing imaginative narratives, many of their observations are
pertinent to understanding legal discourse. The functions performed by
omniscient narrators, in particular, seem remarkably parallel to those
performed by the classic judicial “narrator,” the voice operating in the
conventional judicial opinion, 146 who likewise “bring[s] into being” legal
relations; “report[s]” thoughts (both those mental states relevant to legal
determinations and others, like the “mental state” of a legislature);
sometimes “flaunt[s]” its ability to “determine how things [will] turn out”;
and selectively filters relevant information.147 Reading such opinions,
lawyers and other judges are put in a position analogous to that taken by the
readers of novels with omniscient narrators.
4. Preliminary Implications for Understanding Legal Fictions
Legal scholarship has been virtually oblivious to the work just
described. The above sketch identifies a number of concepts important to
that work but absent from scholarship on legal fictions. These concepts
include the importance of clarifying the frames of reference, or “worlds,”
within fictional statements are made, in assessing their truth value; the
related importance of particular attitudes, both natural and acquired or
conventional, in understanding and using fictional statements; the
possibility that fiction making and reading might be valuable human
activities rather than deviant or quasi-deceptive acts; and the central, rather
than subordinate, role of “impossible” fictions in providing this value.
In Part IV, I will return to these points in more detail, building on the
information about legal parallels to fictions of legislative omniscience
examined in Part III. It is, however, possible at this point to present some
preliminary additions to the classic account of legal fictions that shed light
on assumptions of legislative omniscience. Legal doctrines that rest on
notions of deliberate action and expressions of will (like the “faithful agent”
construct) all require us to make inferences about the “minds” of others.
These inferences are like what cognitive scientists call mindreading; in
146

See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND
POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY
IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990); Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as
Literary Genre, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 201 (1990).
147
In addition to the sources cited in the previous note, see especially Robert Cover,
Violence and the Word, 8 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). Cover focuses on the non-judicial
“audience” for these performances, rather than on the audience made up of other judges
and lawyers.
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ordinary life, we develop the ability to draw such inferences by imagining
states of mind in both real and fictive people. 148 The legal postulation of
such “minds” is very closely analogous to their narrative postulation, and
postulations in both spheres involve fiction-making: generating a prop for
use in readers’ making believe that such “minds” exist and have contents
different from the readers’ own. Fictions of legislative omniscience, when
asserted by judges, both enable and remind those whose practices rely on
such props (lawyers and judges, but not all scholars) to make certain
imaginative, but perfectly everyday, leaps outside their own minds.
III. OTHER FICTIONS OF OMNISCIENCE
This Part addresses some fictions of omniscience in other areas of law.
It starts with the ill-defined body of fictions relating to the imputation of
knowledge from one individual to others in joint undertakings, such as
principal-agent relationships, some corporate contexts, and some criminal
conspiracies. In a many circumstances, the law deems such individuals to
be, as it were, telepathically connected, sharing one another’s mental states.
In some respects, these doctrines are the closest cousins of fictions of
legislative omniscience; like those fictions, these doctrines operate in a
variety of legal areas and rarely receive critical scrutiny by judges.
Similar devices in two other areas, in contrast, have received
significantly more attention; for that reason, I address them separately.
These are the controversial fiction imputing knowledge of the criminal law
to criminal defendants (making unavailable to them the defense of
ignorance or mistake of law), and the much less controversial fiction of the
“person having ordinary skill in the art,” a construct unique to patent law
but sharing several features with the assumptions discussed in Part I.149
A. Constructive Notice of Information Known to Others

148

Suzanne Keen, A Theory of Narrative Empathy, 14:3 NARRATIVE 207, 219 (2006)
(citing and discussing David S. Miall, On the Necessity of Empirical Studies of Literary
Reading, 14 FRAME 43 (2000)).
149
Space does not permit discussion of a number of other ways in which the law
imputes impossible or unlikely knowledge to real or fictional actors. These include, but are
not limited to, the fraud-on-the-market theory used in securities law, see, e.g., P. Smith,
supra note ___, at 1455-57; Randy D. Gordon, Fictitious Fraud: Economics and the
Presumption of Reliance, 9 INT’L J. OF LAW IN CONTEXT 506 (2013); and the reasonable
person, see especially MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN
EGALITARIAN RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD (2003).
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1. Scope and Function
Doctrines of constructive or imputed notice are so deeply rooted in so
many areas of law that they seldom receive direct attention. The most
comprehensive scholarly treatment of these principles apparently remains
an 1883 article by William Scott in the American Law Review. 150 Scott
addresses five kinds of constructive notice—notice of registered property
documents, notice under the doctrine of lis pendens, constructive notice
arising out of actual notice (the notion of being “on notice”), constructive
notice arising out of willful blindness, and a principal’s constructive notice
of matters known to his or her agent.151 The first three of these forms of
constructive notice, in some ways, resemble assumptions of legislative
omniscience more than the last, as they involve the imputation to a party of
legally relevant information that is available to be known. But as Scott
explains, these forms of constructive notice are theoretically unproblematic;
they can be explained as restatements of a legal duty to inform oneself of
relevant information before taking action.152 Moreover, these forms of
constructive notice impute to an actor knowledge of information that is,
generally, possible to acquire, unlike the knowledge imputed to the
legislature on many versions of the legislative omniscience fiction.153
But information imputed from an agent to his or her principal seems
different. Usually, principals enlist agents so that the principals do not need
to learn all that the agents do, and the law condones this type of
relationship. So it would be inconsistent for the law to impose on the
principal a duty to learn all the agent knows. Why impute the agent’s

150

William L. Scott, Constructive Notice, Its Nature and Limitations, 17 AM. L. REV.
849 (1883). Although commentators on statutory interpretation have characterized implied
legislative intent as a kind of “constructive” intent, there have been no extended studies of
the conceptual relationship between constructive legislative knowledge and doctrines of
constructive knowledge in other areas of law. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s
Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 281 (2011).
151
Scott, supra note ___, at 859-63, 882-83; see also The Doctrine of Constructive
Notice, 4 LAW COACH 157-58 (1924) (outlining similar list and stating, “[i]mputed
knowledge is what one’s agents know”).
152
See, e.g., Scott, supra note ___, at 860; see also Rudolf Callmann, Constructive
Notice and Laches: A Study in the Nature of Legal Concepts, 42 TRADEMARK REP. 395,
396-72 (1952) (making a similar point with respect to imputation to trademark registrants
of knowledge of previously registered trademarks).
153
Similarly, constructive notice based on willful blindness is imputed knowledge of
facts that would have been known had the actor not closed his or her eyes to them—not
facts that would have taken any effort to learn.
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knowledge to the principal, then? Scott spends most of his article154 on this
question, which has become the model for many similar forms of imputed
states of mind, to be discussed shortly. Scott’s conclusion is that this form
of constructive notice can be justified only (1) as a way to protect innocent
third parties155 and (2) more basically, as grounded in a “principle of
substitution, or legal identification,” between principal and agent.156
This far more fictional-seeming conception of constructive knowledge
was easy, as Scott recognized, to extend to larger principal-agent–style
relationships, like corporations. 157 And it has been extended to other, less
formalized, kinds of legally recognized joint action as well. Examples
include the following.


In some scenarios of vicarious liability, information known to or
the state of mind of an employee will be imputed to the
employer contrary to fact.158



In prosecutions of individuals for criminal conspiracy, the
conspiratorial group’s “intention” may be attributed to each
individual, regardless of proof of that individual’s mental state,
for purposes of establishing the criminal liability of that

154

Scott devotes 18 out of 42 pages to this topic, far more space than he spends on any
other form of constructive notice. Scott, supra note ___, at 864-82.
155
Scott, supra note ___, at 858.
156
Scott, supra note ___, at 871 (“[I]t would seem that the theory of legal
identification,—of alter ego,—that by intendment of the law the principal is present in the
transaction in the person of his agent, the agent’s act being his act, and the agent’s
knowledge his knowledge, is the more logical and consistent ground upon which to rest
this doctrine in all classes of agency.”).
157
See Scott, supra note ___, at 890-91 (discussing this extension). Corporate
personality may be the earliest legal fiction that we still recognize in a similar form, and
that was treated as such by medieval European commentators. See OLIVIER, supra note
___, at 17 (discussing treatment of corporate personality by canonists). As a number of
commentators have noted, it also has significant analogies to the notion of legislative
intent. See, e.g., Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus of Corporate
Scienter, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 104-05 (2006) (noting parallels between notions
of legislative intent and corporate responsibility, as well as orthodox conceptions of the
group intentionality of juries and appellate panels). Max Radin famously criticized
legislative intent as a fiction in Radin, supra note ___, at 870; his contemporary Felix
Cohen criticized corporate agency along similar lines in Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809-14 (1935).
158
See Abril & Olazabal, supra note ___, at 113 (“If a rogue employee commits a
crime unbeknownst to and without the direct or indirect encouragement of his superiors,
and . . . benefits the employer, the employer may be liable for the employee’s actions.”).
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individual, 159 and a defendant to a conspiracy charge need not
have knowledge of “all the details” or participants in the
conspiracy to be convicted.160


Similarly, under so-called Pinkerton liability, a criminal
defendant can be held individually liable for crimes committed
by his or her co-conspirators, despite lacking knowledge and the
mental state required for a freestanding conviction, as long as the
defendant agreed to the group’s aims and the separate crime bore
some general causal relation to the conspiracy. 161



In criminal prosecution of a corporation, the knowledge of
corporate employees may under some circumstances be
“aggregated” to establish the mens rea required to convict the
corporation, so that the corporation as a whole may be said to
“know” the facts making its conduct illegal, even though no one
employee had such knowledge.162



By extension, in actions under the federal securities statutes, the
knowledge of directors, officers, and employees—and perhaps
even of those outside the corporation—may be imputed to a
corporation to establish the scienter required for the
corporation’s liability. 163

159

See Jens David Ohlin, Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective
Reason, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 152-53 (2007) (“[B]y virtue of the criminal
agreement, the act and intentions of one become the act and intentions of the other. . . .”).
160
See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947).
161
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); see also United States v. Alvarez,
755 F.3d 830, 850 (11th Cir. 1985); Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the
Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 618-19 (2008) (noting that
at least one court has held that “a defendant could be vicariously liable for crimes that were
committed before he even joined the conspiracy”) (citing United States v. Miranda-Ortiz,
926 F.2d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 1991)).
162
United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.3d 844 (1st Cir. 1987); Abril &
Olazabal, supra note ___, at 86 (describing this approach). See also generally Thomas A.
Hagemann & Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology of Aggregate Corporate Knowledge: A
Deconstruction, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 210 (1997). Hagemann and Grinstein are critical
of this doctrine; they contend that only commentators, not courts, have approved conviction
based on the aggregation of such knowledge absent a showing of “willful blindness” on the
part of the organization. See id. at 211-12, 227.
163
City of Monroe Employees Ret. Syst. v. Bridgestone Corp., 387 F.3d 468 (6th Cir.
2004) (taking this approach); Abril & Olazabal, supra note ___, at 153-54 (“When a major
corporate event . . . is part of the public record or has been highly publicized, a corporation
should be deemed to ‘know’ it for purposes of proving the corporation’s scienter.”).
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Some other, slightly more exotic, extensions of the same principle
include the following.


In strict products liability, knowledge of a product’s dangers
available at the time of litigation is imputed to the manufacturer
as of the time of manufacture.164



For Fourth Amendment purposes, the knowledge supplying
probable cause to search or arrest that is held by one member of
a police force may be deemed to be held also by those other
members who actually carried out the search or arrest.165

Clearly, some of these variants depart further from the basic principalagent scenario than others. The most straightforward extensions seem to be
those imputing knowledge or a mental state from an employee to an
individual employer or from one criminal co-venturer to another.166 When
knowledge or a state of mind is imputed to a collective rather than an
individual, the doctrine involves not only a kind of thought transference but
also a personification of something that does not possess a state of mind in
the same sense that an individual does. Not surprisingly, commentary and
controversy have tended to focus more on these scenarios than on the
others.167 The final two examples above seem even more anomalous, for
164

See, e.g., Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products
Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1192 (1992) (“Many
courts . . . impute[] the knowledge of the product’s danger available at the time of trial to
the manufacturer as of the time of the product’s manufacture.”).
165
See Simon Stern, Constructive Knowledge, Probable Cause, and Administrative
Decisionmaking, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1086 (2007) (describing the typical
operation of what Stern calls the “constructive-knowledge rule” as follows: “several
officers are investigating a crime, none personally has probable cause, one of them
conducts a search or arrest anyway, and the court lets in the evidence on the theory that the
officers knew enough in the aggregate to support probable cause”) (citing and discussing
United States v. Gillette, 245 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bernard, 623 F.3d
552 (9th Cir. 1980)).
166
On the latter point, see also Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE
L.J. 609, 617-20, 624, 634-35 (1984) (discussing imputed culpability, i.e., state of mind, in
doctrines of complicity and vicarious liability, as well as felony murder, as analogous in
important respects).
167
See, e.g., William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and
Variants of Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285 (2000) (describing the debate
and proposing a resolution); Hagemann & Grimstein, supra note ___; Stern, Constructive,
supra note ___.
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different reasons: in strict products liability, because the knowledge is not
only being imputed to a non-human entity but by definition could not have
been known to anyone, human or not, at the time it is deemed to have been
possessed; in the probable cause scenario, because of the perverse
incentives stifling actual information-sharing that the doctrine seems to
supply. The acceptability of these two scenarios despite these bizarre
features suggests the remarkable solidity of the basic paradigm—the
“identification” of one mind with another that Scott describes with so little
hesitation as an unproblematic legal device.
2. Justifying Constructive Knowledge
Why are these doctrines so acceptable? At one time, commentators had
no hesitation in describing constructive notice doctrines as “fictions,” 168 but
this label is seldom applied to these areas of law any longer. They appear
now to be considered, in many forms, just ordinary legal principles.
The standard justifications for these principles, when offered, fall into
three general categories. The first is more a matter of stipulation than
justification; it is the simple identity explanation that Scott offered.169 This
explanation tends to work less well the further one travels from the core
principal-agent model.
Another set of explanations is normative. Constructive knowledge is
sometimes justified as necessary to protect innocent third parties170 or to
hold culpable actors—be they individuals or groups, such as corporations—
responsible for the social effects of their actions. 171 Relatedly, constructiveknowledge doctrines are sometimes justified on a kind of deterrence
rationale harking back to Scott’s observation about constructive notice of
legally relevant facts. The idea is that if a socially beneficial result would
follow from imposing a legal duty on a person to inform him- or herself
168

See, e.g., VEPA P. SARATHI, V.K. VARADACHARI’S LEGAL FICTIONS 30, 33, 83
(1979; 2d ed., 2012).
169
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
170
See Scott, supra note ___, at 858.
171
See, e.g., Harold Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 112
(1916) (“If th[e] empoyer is compelled to bear the burden of his servant’s torts even when
he . . . is . . . without fault, it is because in a social distribution of profit and loss, the
balance of least disturbance seems thereby to be attained.”); Robinson, supra note ___, at
619 (describing responsibility as justification for imputed criminal liability); Wertheimer,
supra note ___, at 1209-10 (arguing that strict products liability, without a state-of-the-art
defense, is necessary for reasons similar to those offered by Professor Laski).
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about the matters in question, the law is justified in treating that person as
having so informed him- or herself, regardless of the facts.172
No one normative rationale, however, seems to fit each of the examples
listed above equally well. 173 And some—notably the imputation of
knowledge among police officers for probable cause purposes—appear to
lack any good normative justification. Indeed, the main justification for that
doctrine seems to be evidentiary: if the individual officers would eventually
have shared the information they each possessed, then the lawfulness of the
search or arrest should not turn on an accident of timing.174 An evidentiary
rationale can be generated for the other variations on the constructiveknowledge theme as well. In each case, we endorse imputing the contents
of someone’s mind to a different actor because it would be too difficult or
uncertain to confirm the presence or absence of those contents in the mind
of the actor to whom they are imputed. It does not really matter, in the core
principal-agent scenario, whether the principal actually knew precisely what
the agent did, in every detail; determining whether the principal did know
this is gratuitous given the principal’s legal relationship to the agent.175
Similarly, co-conspirators might share intentions and knowledge to different
degrees; determining the precise extent to which these mental states were
shared would consume as much time as, if not more time than, proving
objective elements of the crimes in question, with no assurance of a clear
conclusion.176
172

See, e.g., Scott, supra note ___, at 860; Robinson, supra note ___, at 626, 658-59
(discussing deterrence rationale for doctrines of vicarious criminal liability).
173
See, e.g., Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note ___ (criticizing aggregation of mental
states within corporation for purposes of criminal liability). Hagemann and Grinstein
acknowledge that the doctrinal modification they propose—adding a willful blindness
element—also involves imputing information to actors. Id. at 246 (“[T]he willful blindness
doctrine imputes to defendants knowledge that they never actually acquired. The collective
knowledge rule, on the other hand, takes knowledge that does exist, albeit in separate
locations, and accumulates it.”). See also discussion infra notes ___ and accompanying
text [ignorance of the law].
174
Cf. Stern, Constructive, supra note ___, at 1115 (discussing possibility of justifying
constructive-knowledge doctrine by reference to inevitable-discovery doctrine). Despite
presenting this possibility, Stern does not endorse the doctrine, noting its asymmetrical
application: “[T]he courts feel most compelled to reject the idea of omniscience when
there is a risk that imputing information to the acting officer would make the officer liable
for a civil rights violation.” Id. at 1140.
175
Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., “Fetch Some Soupmeat,” 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2209
(1995).
176
See, e.g., Robinson, supra note ___, at 620 n.13 (“The evidentiary theory is most
often employed to support imputation of mental rather than objective elements. One would
expect such a pattern of application since the evidentiary rationale responds to problems of
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The evidentiary perspective also helps to explain why we no longer
consider at least the more basic forms of these doctrines to involve legal
fictions. In a principal-agent relationship, the “facts” of the principal’s
mental state do not matter beyond those necessary to establish the
relationship; the law defines such facts as irrelevant. We accordingly have
no basis for considering the law’s approach to these matters to be
counterfactual or fictional. In this area, notions that were once considered
fictions have been so thoroughly absorbed into legal practice and discourse
that they have become just another way of establishing the premises for a
legal conclusion—not one depending on the presentation of evidence in the
traditional sense, but also not one that displaces or conflicts with the
establishment of factual premises for a legal conclusion.
To clarify this point further, the next part turns to a legal principle that,
at first glance, seems closely related to constructive knowledge doctrines
and is sometimes discussed alongside them. 177 This principle, however,
unlike the doctrines discussed just above, is still often described as
involving a fiction.
B. The Legal Knowledge of the Criminal Defendant
1. Scope and Function
The maxim “ignorance of the law is no defense” refers to the general
denial to criminal defendants of the defense that they were not aware that
their conduct was against the law. In some formulations, the maxim is
turned into a fiction, deeming the criminal defendant to know the law (and
thereby precluding assertions to the contrary). While the legitimacy of
equating the bar with this imputation of knowledge to the defendant is not
unproblematic, the equation has long been and continues to be made. 178
proof, and proof of mental elements is more difficult than proof of objective elements.”).
177
See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Varieties of Strict Liability, 8 CAN. J. L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 189, 212 (1995) (discussing ignorantia maxim as variety of strict
liability).
178
One early commentator, Jeremiah Smith, argued that the bar on the ignorance-ofthe-law defense could not be considered equivalent to an assumption about criminal
defendants’ knowledge. Jeremiah Smith, Surviving Fictions II, 3 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 24, 2425 (1918-19) (“There is no such presumption [of the criminal defendant’s knowledge of the
law]. . . . It is a fiction. . . . That any actual system of law is knowable by those who are
bound to obey it ‘is so notoriously and ridiculously false that I shall not occupy your time
with proof to the contrary.’”) (quoting JOHN AUSTIN, 1 JURISPRUDENCE 497 (3d ed., 1869)).
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This fiction is of very long standing, perhaps even longer than the
doctrines discussed in the previous section.179 Unlike principal-agent
constructive notice, this fiction does not involve mindreading or telepathy;
rather, it imputes to the defendant knowledge of publicly available
information. In this respect, it is closer kin to the recorded-title and lis
pendens forms of constructive notice, as well as to some versions of the
fiction of legislative omniscience.
Also like the fictions of legislative omniscience, and unlike many forms
of constructive notice, this fiction does not function as a direct premise for
legal conclusions. Rather, it is a way of justifying the rule denying
defendants use of an ignorance-of-law defense—but only sometimes. It
appears that exceptions have always been recognized,180 most notably when
it would have truly been impossible for the defendant, or anyone in the
defendant’s position, to have known of the law making conduct an offense
(because, for example, the law had not yet been made public).181 Over the
course of the twentieth century, U.S. courts have permitted an ignorance-ofthe-law defense in an increasing number of additional situations. 182
The only justification needed for the substantive rule barring the defense, Smith argued, is
the impossibility of judging a defendant’s claim to ignorance. J. Smith, supra, at 25.
179
By some accounts, the imputation of knowledge of the law to criminal defendants,
regardless of their actual states of knowledge, dates back to Roman law. See, e.g., Edwin
R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 77-78
(1908); Vera Bolgar, The Present Function of the Maxim Ignorantia Juris Non Excusat—A
Comparative Study, 53 IOWA L. REV. 626, 627 (1967). Other commentators date it to early
English law. See Livingston Hall & Selig J. Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U.
CHI. L. REV. 641, 643-45 (1941). For some reason, Professor Smith has identified it as a
“new legal fiction.” P. Smith, supra note ___, at 1460. Regardless of its exact age, the
principle has long been widely applied in Anglo-American law. See, e.g., Rollin M.
Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 35, 35 (1939); Bruce
Grace, Note, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1392, 1392 (1986);
Davies, supra note ___, at 344 n.9; Kenneth W. Simons, Ignorance and Mistake of
Criminal Law, Noncriminal Law, and Fact, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487 (2012).
180
Some have argued that the principle has always been honored in the breach. See,
e.g., Bolgar, supra note ___, at 640 (“[F]rom the time the rule begins to appear in the
courts of the United States . . ., it was used more as a means for balancing considerations of
equity than as a basis for strict judicial interpretation.”).
181
See, e.g., Hall & Seligman, supra note ___, at 657.
182
For a discussion of one notable context in which these exceptions have emerged,
see Davies, supra note ___ (discussing and criticizing the trend). See also, e.g., Murdock
v. United States, 290 U.S. 389 (1933); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991);
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994). For commentary, see Hall & Seligman,
supra note ___, at 642 (“There are now a number of exceptions to the rule, and their
creation and shaping is largely a product of American judicial decision since the beginning
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As the irregular application of the rule suggests, the accompanying
fiction has been subjected to extensive analysis; it is probably the most
extensively criticized of all the fictions discussed in this Article. The next
section summarizes some themes of this analysis.
2. Justifications for the Fiction
There are two standard rationales for imputing knowledge of the law to
criminal defendants. One is evidentiary: allowing the defense of ignorance
of the law would lead to irresolvable disputes over the state of individual
defendants’ knowledge. Prosecutors would have no straightforward way to
rebut a defendant’s assertion of ignorance.183 Since some assumptions need
to be made to prove defendant’s state of mind in any event, it is more
efficient to assume a uniform state of knowledge on the defendant’s part,
one that coincides with the collective state of knowledge of prosecutor,
defense counsel, and judge (if not the jury pool). The second rationale, a
normative one often attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes,184 proposes that
withholding the defense will encourage the populace to take steps to know
and comply with the law. If courts adhere to the rule, this argument goes,
then widespread knowledge that criminal defendants are deemed to know
the law will encourage potential lawbreakers to inform themselves about the
law, knowing that they will not be able to use their ignorance as a defense
should they break the law and be prosecuted.185
Both rationales have been criticized.

The most consistent line of

of the nineteenth century.”); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse—But Only
for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 150 (1997); Alexander P. Robbins, Comment,
After Howard and Monetta: Is Ignorance of the Law a Defense to Administrative Liability
for Aiding and Abetting Violations of the Federal Securities Laws?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 299
(2007) (arguing against allowing the defense in this context); Mark D. Yochum, Ignorance
of the Law Is No Excuse Except for Tax Crimes, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 221 (1989) (criticizing
trend toward allowing defense in tax crime prosecutions); Mark D. Yochum, The Death of
a Maxim: Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse (Killed by Money, Drugs, and a Little Sex),
13 ST. JOHN’S LEGAL COMMENT. 635, 639 (1999).
183
See, e.g., Perkins, supra note ___, at 41, 44; Bolgar, supra note ___, at 627-28;
John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of Law, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L.
1, 67 (1997); Davies, supra note ___, at 353 n.53.
184
Parry, supra note ___, at 67; Davies, supra note ___, at 354.
185
See also Bolgar, supra note ___, at 655-56 (“[T]he necessity that laws must be
known by responsible and free citizens arose . . . from the theory that citizens are
responsible, that they are free, and that the law in its enacted form . . . should recognize this
responsibility and respect this freedom.”).
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criticism, like the standard critiques of legislative omniscience, fastens on
the inaccuracy of the fiction as a description of defendants’ actual states of
knowledge. Given this inaccuracy, critics contend, the imputation of legal
knowledge to the defendant is unsupported as an evidentiary presumption
(so the evidentiary rationale is weak);186 moreover, the rule does not seem
to have been effective in encouraging lawful behavior (weakening the
normative rationale). 187 This double-barreled criticism seems to underlie
many of the exceptions American courts have permitted. It has become
only more forceful over time: as criminal laws have multiplied, the
discrepancy between the knowledge that the fiction imputes to a criminal
defendant and the defendant’s actual knowledge of the law becomes
greater,188 while the difficulty of proving the defendant’s actual knowledge
presumably remains about the same, so the evidentiary presumption
becomes increasingly unsupportable, while the normative rationale becomes
ever more unrealistic.189
So far, the arguments concerning this fiction seem to parallel some of
those made about fictions of legislative omniscience. But the debates have
not ended here. Although he does not use the “fiction” term, in a 1997
article Professor Kahan advanced an alternative account of the imputation
186

See, e.g., Keedy, supra note ___, at 78 (“Under modern conditions . . ., it would
hardly be seriously maintained that [‘the law is certain and capable of being
ascertained’].”); Hall & Seligman, supra note ___, at 660 (“[I]t is not . . . an exaggeration
to say that it is literally impossible for a citizen to assemble all the relevant rules . . . which
might apply to his daily conduct. . . .”); Bolgar, supra note ___, at 638 (“[L]aw might or
ought be knowable by all who are bound to obey it, but that any actual system is knowable,
is ridiculously and notoriously false.”).
187
It is unfair, the argument continues, to hold a defendant responsible for violating a
law of which the defendant was unaware; when a defendant does not know that his or her
conduct is illegal and is subjected to criminal liability anyway, the defendant’s punishment
is out of step with the purposes of imposing criminal liability. See, e.g., Grace, supra note
___, at 1392 (arguing for “a mistake of law defense for laws that criminalize ordinary
behavior”); Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion, and the Fairness of Notice:
Confronting “Apparent Innocence” in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1-5
(1995).
188
See, e.g., Grace, supra note ___, at 1395-96 (“[I]n modern times, this presumption
is largely fictional.”); Pilcher, supra note ___, at 14 (“[E]ven if there was once a time when
the criminal law was so simple and limited in scope that such a presumption was justified,
it is now an ‘obvious fiction’ and ‘so far-fetched . . . as to be quixotic.’”); Davies, supra
note ___, at 350 n.38; Wayne Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 83 (2011)
(“The expectation that the law is ‘definite and knowable’ is no more tenable for police
today than it is for the lay public.”).
189
Some have predicted that, as a result, courts will eventually abandon the bar on the
defense. See Yochum, 1999, supra note ___, at 673.
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as a motivated departure from accurate description.190 Professor Kahan
argued that, contrary to the Holmesian rationale, lawmakers and judges do
not forbid the ignorance-of-law defense because they want citizens to
inform themselves about the law. Citizens would be likely to inform
themselves of the law if they were to be held liable when they were
negligent in informing themselves; holding them strictly liable regardless of
their efforts to inform themselves does not provide the right incentive.191
According to Professor Kahan, the rule is best explained as a device of
“prudent obfuscation” judges use to veil their need for “flexibility to adapt
the law to innovative forms of crime ex post,” a flexibility that, if avowed,
might make decisions seem standardless. 192 This explanation resembles the
classic conception of legal fictions described above, according to which
they allow judges to adjust law to new circumstances.193 But it is difficult
to understand Professor Kahan’s argument as a defense of the classic
understanding of legal fictions, since he clearly considers the imputation of
legal knowledge to criminal defendants to be descriptively inaccurate; to
him, the device allows judges to conceal what they are really doing
(adjusting the application of legal rules to circumstances) by saying that
they are doing something else (just assuming that all know the law).
The persistence of this fiction might be difficult to explain, but it
illustrates the tenacity of assumptions of omniscience in legal justification.
And it demonstrates that continuing to analyze fictions of omniscience
using the classic understanding of legal fictions is unlikely to lead either to
their final disavowal or to a conclusive justification of them as knowing
falsehoods. Perhaps here, as with the practices discussed in Part I,
something more is at work than just judicial mystification or ignorance.

190

Kahan, supra note ___.
Kahan, supra note ___, at 133-36, 140.
192
Kahan, supra note ___, at 139, 140-41 (“[T]he doctrine attempts to discourage legal
knowledge (prudent obfuscation) so that individuals will be more inclined to behave
morally (legal moralism).”).
193
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. As discussed above, however, under
that conception, such adjustments are necessarily not permanent features of the law.
Professor Kahan, in contrast, posits a permanent need for vagueness in criminal law, and it
is not clear that his argument is necessarily limited to criminal law.
191
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C. The PHOSITA’s Knowledge of the Pertinent Prior Art
1. Scope and Function
Patent law in the United States and elsewhere194 makes extensive use of
a construct known as the “person having ordinary skill in the art,” or
PHOSITA.195 This term refers to the perspective from which judges
assessing the validity and scope of patent claims are to apply a number of
the law’s requirements. The original context in which this construct arose,
and still perhaps the most challenging and important context in which it
applies, is with respect to determining the obviousness of an invention. The
inventor of a new product or process may receive a patent only if it would
not have been “obvious” to the PHOSITA to make the product or use the
process at the time of its invention.196
Patent law also requires patent examiners and judges to assume the
PHOSITA’s perspective in other areas, including assessment of the novelty
and utility of an invention,197 as well as assessment of whether the patent
194

See, e.g., Richard Weiner, Nonobviousness:
Foreign Approaches, in
NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 413 (John Witherspoon
ed., 1980); see also infra note ___.
195
This abbreviation was coined by Cyril A. Soans, Some Absurd Presumptions in
Patent Law, 10 IDEA 433, 438 (1966), and adopted by the Federal Circuit in KimberlyClark Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1984), but the
underlying notion dates to a mid-nineteenth-century Supreme Court decision, Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 253 (1850) (referring to the “ordinary mechanic acquainted with
the business” in connection with the precursor to modern nonobviousness analysis).
196
35 U.S.C. § 103(A) (requiring that the “nonobviousness” of an invention be
assessed from the perspective of “a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter [of the patent application] pertains”). Similar standards appear in the patent
law of Canada and the European Union. See Patent Act (Canada), R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4, s.
28.3 (“The subject-matter defined by a claim in an application for a patent . . . must be
subject-matter that would not have been obvious . . . to a person skilled in the art or science
to which it pertains.”); Eur. Patent Conv., Art. 56 (“[A]n invention shall be considered as
involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a
person skilled in the art”).
197
An invention is novel if it is not anticipated by the prior art, which includes existing
publications and issued patents existing at the time of the invention. Since 1876, U.S.
courts have held that prior art may anticipate a patent if the prior art “exhibit[s] the later
patented invention in such a full and intelligible manner as to enable persons skilled in the
art to which the invention is related to comprehend it without assistance from the patent, or
to make it. . . .” Cohn v. U.S. Corset Co., 93 U.S. 366, 370 (1876).
An invention is useful if it performs some benefit and is not impossible to construct,
operate, or generate. In assessing the utility of an invention, U.S. courts similarly ask
whether “a person having ordinary skill in the art . . . has reason to doubt the objective truth

Draft—please don’t quote or cite without author’s permission

54

FICTIONS OF OMNISCIENCE

[21-Jul-14

application’s description “enables” the invention, 198 to mention just a few
central examples. Obviousness, however, is by many accounts the most
important inquiry based on the construct.199 It is also the context in which
the PHOSITA construct’s nature and application is perhaps most
challenging and illuminating for the topic of this Article.
In the obviousness context, the PHOSITA has two key characteristics:
first, it is an entirely hypothetical, not a real, perspective, and second, it has
“omniscient” knowledge of the pertinent prior art. The PHOSITA has
famously been described as a “ghost[]”200 and a “doppelganger,”201 and the
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court have repeatedly emphasized its
difference from the perspectives of actual inventors, patent applicants,
examiners, and judges.202 The PHOSITA, that is, is a kind of fictional
character that judges are directed to tailor-generate for each inquiry into
obviousness. Sometimes, the PHOSITA’s likeness to a fictional character
is very close to the surface, as this passage from a 1966 opinion illustrates:
We think the proper way to apply the . . . obviousness test to a case like
this is to first picture the inventor as working in his shop with the prior art
references—which he is presumed to know—hanging on the walls around
him. One then notes that what [the] applicant . . . built here he admits is
basically a Gerbe bag holder [an invention disclosed in a piece of prior art]
having air-blast bag opening to which he has added two bag retaining pins. . . .
[The applicant] would have said to himself, ‘Now what can I do to hold them
more securely?’ Looking around the walls, he sees Hellman’s envelopes with
holes in their flaps hung on a rod [another piece of prior art]. He would then
of the [patent] applicant’s assertions” regarding the benefit and operability of the invention
described. Sean Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1493 (2011).
198
The Patent Act explicitly mentions a “skilled in the art” perspective in connection
with enablement: the patent disclosure must “contain a written description of the
invention . . ., in such . . . terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains . . . to make and use the same.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(1).
199
See, e.g., John O. Tresansky, PHOSITA—The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in
Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 37, 37 (1991) (“The most frequent use
of the skill level in an art . . . is in determining whether an invention meets the . . .
condition for patentability of nonobviousness. . . .”); Joseph P. Meara, Just Who Is the
Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH.
L. REV. 267, 272 (2002) (calling obviousness “the most litigated aspect of patent law”).
200
Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(describing PHOSITA as “not unlike the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law”).
201
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1187 (2002).
202
See, e.g., In re Kleinman, 484 F.2d 1389, 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Standard Oil Co.
v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co.,
234 F.3d 654, 666-67 (Fed Cir. 2000).
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say to himself, ‘Ha! I can punch holes in my bags and put a little rod (pin)
through the holes. That will hold them! After filling the bags, I’ll pull them
off the pins as does Hellman. Scoring the flap should make tearing easier.’203

This vignette engages most extensively with the PHOSITA’s imaginary,
constructed status.
It mentions only in passing the other crucial
characteristic of the PHOSITA that is posited for inquiries into obviousness:
this PHOSITA is “presumed to know” all the “prior art references”—that is,
all available information about inventions existing at the time of conceiving
the claimed invention, regardless of their fame or accessibility. 204 These
two characteristics place the PHOSITA surprisingly close to at least some
fictions of legislative omniscience. The PHOSITA is an avowedly unreal
construct, not just because it does not correspond to any actual human
being, but also because it has knowledge of a body of information that no
actual person would be at all likely, or in some cases able, to know.
Unlike the omniscient legislature, however, the PHOSITA is largely
regarded as not only defensible but indispensable, by both courts and
commentators. Serious calls for eliminating the construct entirely from
patent law are rare. Embrace of the PHOSITA has, to be sure, shifted over
the years, as judicial definition of its characteristics has passed from the
Supreme Court to the Federal Circuit and back again, but commitment to
the construct itself has never been in question—only the best way to

203

In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1017 (C.C.P.A. 1966), cited in Dan L. Burk, Do
Patents Have Gender?, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. & POL’Y 881, 890-91 (2011). This
vignette captures the standard features of the PHOSITA in the nonobviousness analysis:
this person knows all of the pertinent prior art, and is therefore omniscient. The person
also is capable of combining these prior art teachings to come up with a putatively new
invention that is, nevertheless, obvious to this PHOSITA, and therefore unpatentable. The
PHOSITA is less inventive, in other words, than the successful patent applicant, even
though the PHOSITA also knows more than this successful patent applicant does or can
know about the prior art.
204
See, e.g., In re Rouffet, 149 F.2d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The legal
construct . . . presumes that all prior art references in the field of the invention are available
to this hypothetical skilled artisan.”); Tresansky, supra note ___, at 40-41 (“While an
inventor is no longer presumed to have knowledge of all material prior art, the hypothetical
PHOSITA, although possessed only of ordinary skill, is presumed to be aware of all of the
pertinent prior art.”); Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s
PHOSITA Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 227, 235 & n.39 (2009) (“[T]he PHOSITA is
presumed to have read, understood, and remembered every existing reference from the
prior art.”) (citing, inter alia, Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 493
(1900) (charging inventor with “a knowledge of all preexisting devices”); Eaton v. Evans,
16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 454-55 (1818)).
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conceive of it and use it.205 Commentary on the construct is nevertheless
illuminating for purposes of understanding the subject of this Article.
2. Justifications for the Construct
Although the paradoxical features of the PHOSITA might seem to make
the perspective difficult for a decisionmaker to assume, courts appear
willing to assume a PHOSITA or PHOSITA-like perspective to assess an
increasingly wide variety of questions. Commentators also endorse it;
rather than a problem, they widely view the construct as a pet concept that
is both useful and important.
Typically, the PHOSITA’s two features are justified differently. The
fictionality or hypothetical nature of the construct is usually described as
necessary to prevent hindsight bias, the risk that an invention will be
considered obvious once it exists, regardless of how obvious it might have
been to the inventor’s contemporaries.206 Forcing decisionmakers to
displace themselves from their real-life vantage points in space and time is
understood to force them to assume some distance from their own
assumptions—to engage in metacognition. This understanding of the
PHOSITA’s function may explain the tendency among commentators to
sharpen and specify the PHOSITA’s characteristics, making it more
“lifelike,” for example, by adding limitations on the prior art to which the
PHOSITA would have access207 or by endowing the PHOSITA with

205

The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in KSR Int’l, Inc. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S.
398 (2007), clarified that the PHOSITA should be understood as able to combine the
“teachings” of scattered pieces of prior art to achieve obvious insights rather than simply
able to extrapolate from shortcomings of particular prior inventions, contrary to the Federal
Circuit’s then-prevailing test for obviousness in light of prior art: “The idea that a
[PHOSITA] designer hoping to make [an invention like the one at issue in KSR] would
ignore [a particular prior art reference] just because [it] was designed to solve a different
problem makes little sense. A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420-21. This standard suggests an even
greater role for judicial fictionalizing, in the sense of imaginatively taking the PHOSITA’s
perspective, than the Federal Circuit had at that point been willing to endorse. See also
generally Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 52-55 (2010)
(discussing KSR in context of Supreme Court’s recent patent jurisprudence).
206
See, e.g., Tresansky, supra note ___, at 887.
207
Natalie A. Thomas, Secondary Considerations in Nonobviousness Analysis: The
Use of Objective Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2102 (2011)
(making this recommendation); Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60
DUKE L.J. 919, 959-63 (2011) (making similar recommendation in novelty context).
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ordinary economic incentives and motives.208
This justification does not directly apply, however, to the imputation of
“omniscience”209 to the PHOSITA. This feature of the PHOSITA has been
more gingerly defended and more widely questioned. The main rationale
for the PHOSITA’s omniscience is the familiar one that assuming
omniscience avoids “difficult issues of proof related to the inventor’s actual
knowledge.”210 In addition, however, the characteristic seems justified by
the necessarily public nature of the inquiry involved in nonobviousness (and
other patent validity) analyses. An inventor is entitled to a patent if the
invention claimed would not have been obvious to anyone with the
technical competence to use it—not just if the intention was not obvious to
the actual inventor. To determine whether this is the case, a decisionmaker
must necessarily consider the information that might have been available to
potential competitor-inventors, not just the information actually known to
the inventor. Both the PHOSITA’s hypothetical status and its omniscience
help courts answer the pertinent question.
As noted, the PHOSITA’s omniscience has been treated more
skeptically than its fictionality. The chief reason for this skepticism will
also, by now, be easy to anticipate: omniscience is a descriptively
inaccurate feature for even a fictional construct to have, since it could not
realistically be imputed to any real inventor, patent applicant, examiner, or
judge. 211 This critique, however, is not nearly as overwhelming as the
analogous critique of legislative omniscience; overall, both features of the
PHOSITA—its fictionality and its omniscience—are widely accepted.
The parallels between the PHOSITA and assumptions of legislative
omniscience are striking. Both involve a posited perspective that is deemed
208

Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability,
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1598-99 (2011). Professors Abramowicz and Duffy also argue that
courts should allow the PHOSITA perspective to be that of a corporate entity. Id. at 161516, 1655.
209
Darrow, supra note ___, at 235 nn.39 & 40.
210
Darrow, supra note ___, at 235.
211
See, e.g., Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note ___, at 1606-07 (“The mind of this
hypothetical person comes equipped with a complete and thorough knowledge of all legally
pertinent prior art, far more knowledge than could be possessed by any actual or average
researcher.”); Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1500 (2001) (explaining inaccessibility of much prior art); Daralyn J. Durie & Mark
A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 989, 991-92, 1017 (2008) (arguing that PHOSITA perspective should be applied
based “on what the PHOSITA and the marketplace actually know and believe”).
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to have a special generative relationship to the legally significant text being
construed. And both impute to that perspective an unrealistic access to
publicly available technical and largely textual matter—and through that
matter, to the “minds” of other members of the relevant technical
community. The discontinuities between the PHOSITA and the other
fictions considered in this Article are also, however, worth pausing over for
a moment. The PHOSITA is far more elaborated—more theorized—than
either assumptions of legislative omniscience or the various doctrines of
constructive notice. And it appears far more firmly accepted than either the
assumption of legislative omniscience or the criminal defendant’s imputed
legal knowledge. The divergences noted in those areas between what
commentators are saying and what courts are doing are largely absent here.
In Part IV I consider the implications of these patterns to suggest a
reconceptualization of the work that assumptions of legislative omniscience
do in judicial opinions and commentary.
IV. EXPLAINING THE PATTERNS AND EVALUATING THE FICTIONS OF
LEGISLATIVE OMNISCIENCE
The discussion so far has shown, first, that commentators virtually
unanimously disapprove of assumptions of legislative omniscience,
describing them as descriptively inaccurate fictions that, because of their
inaccuracy, undermine judicial legitimacy. Standard accounts of legal
fictions, however, do not tell us much about exactly why these assumptions
are problematic. In fact, the assumptions singled out by commentators do
not really seem to fit into the standard accounts of legal fictions at all. Part
II suggested an explanation for this apparent mismatch: the limited scope
of our understanding of legal fictions, which has not advanced much
beyond the form it had reached in the early twentieth century. Work on the
phenomenon of fiction in other scholarly disciplines, however, has
advanced far beyond early twentieth-century models, and these advances
suggest a variety of ways of building out our understanding of legal fictions.
This understanding should, among other things, take account of the frames
of reference within which propositions about fictional entities are advanced
and/or discussed, as well as the potential utilities, other than truth in factual
reference (or “descriptive accuracy”), that such propositions have for
writers and especially readers. Part III then showed how propositions
similar to the so-called fictions of legislative omniscience are accepted, by
courts and commentators, in other areas of law, namely in doctrines of
constructive notice and in the various guises of the PHOSITA in patent law.
Unlike assumptions of legislative omniscience, these propositions are not
generally considered threats to the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking.
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Do these observations demonstrate that assumptions of legislative
omniscience are defensible, contrary to the scholarly consensus? Not
exactly. Certain aspects of these assumptions may be far less troubling than
virtually all commentators have assumed; other aspects, however, need
further analysis. The remaining paragraphs of this Article will draw on the
material presented in earlier Parts to explain this conclusion.
An important theme emerging from the discussion in Parts II and III is
the importance of clarifying the frames of reference from within which
assertions about fictional entities are made in considering the work those
assertions do. One could think of these frames of references as discourse
“worlds.” A fictive utterance about Sherlock Holmes is made from within
the discourse world of a narrative concerning Sherlock Holmes. A
transfictive or metafictive utterance about Sherlock Holmes is made from
within a different discourse world, one that includes and encompasses the
fictional discourse world but also allows for assertions about matters of fact
that can be evaluated for their truth and descriptive accuracy. This kind of
clarification is a basic component of philosophical analysis of fiction and
fictionalizing. Part III.A showed how commentators on the ignorantia
maxim, without using precisely the same terminology, seem to have arrived
at a similar conclusion. 212 Understanding assumptions of legislative
omniscience can benefit from a similar treatment. References to these
assumptions (sometimes characterizing the assumptions as fictions) occur
from within two frames of reference, two discourse worlds: the world of
judicial discourse, and the world of scholarly discourse.
Since the core of the scholarly critique of these assumptions concerns
their operation within the first of these worlds, that of judicial discourse,
most of the rest of this Part will address that frame of reference. But it is
also important to consider how the assertions function within the second
discourse world, that of scholarly discourse. Assertions about assumptions
of legislative omniscience from this frame of reference are like transfictive
or, more often, metafictive utterances. They identify the assumptions as
fictions and evaluate them using the same standards that we use to evaluate
references to actual entities, namely, descriptive accuracy. Scholarly
assertions about these particular assumptions are not like the “theoretical
fictions” identified by Vaihinger, Fuller, and other writers on legal fictions,
because these scholarly assertions about assumptions of legislative
212

See supra notes ___ and accompanying text [Kahan discussion].
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omniscience are used not to justify doctrine, but to criticize it, or more
precisely to propose a faulty justification for it. They are more like
assertions about fictional characters that find fault with the characters for
not being real people. It is, nevertheless, primarily due to the commentary
that we recognize the assumptions of legislative omniscience as fictions
(and indeed, they are fictions), although within that commentary, the
observation that the assumptions are fictions has not so far done much
helpful explanatory or evaluative work, for the reasons presented above. 213
The scholarly commentary focuses, of course, on the propriety of
judges’ assertions about legislative omniscience. Judges’ assertions need to
be analyzed differently from scholars’, since judges make their assertions
from within a different discourse world. When scholars make assertions
about judicial assumptions of legislative omniscience, they are telling
stories about courts (and, in recent scholarship, about legislatures as well).
Judges making assertions about what legislatures know are, in contrast,
telling stories mainly about legislatures (but perhaps also about judges), and
more specifically about what the law is, what rules it consists of.
Although they make such assertions frequently, judges do not usually
identify them as fictions, and they do not often explicitly impute
“omniscience” to the legislature. Rather, they deem the legislature to be
aware of or to know certain specific information. 214 However, within the
213

In addition to collapsing the scholarly and judicial discourse worlds, some
scholarship in this area collapses both such worlds with the further distinct discourse
worlds of non-legal everyday life and of statutory enactments. Cf. Gluck & Bressman, Part
II, supra note ___, MS at 55 (asking, in arguing against the rule against redundancies,
“Does the average citizen not repeat herself for emphasis or to ‘cover all the bases’. . . .?”).
214
Judicial opinions usually simply “presume,” “assume,” or “deem” the legislature to
be aware of certain information; they rarely describe these presumptions, assumptions, or
deemings as fictions (and they rarely call the knowledge “omniscience”), as the table below
suggests. This table summarizes results of Westlaw searches in the database of all state
and federal cases, run July 2, 2014:
Search string
(presum! /s legisl! /s know!)
(presum! /s legisl! /s awar!)
(presum! /s legisl! /s omnisc!)
(assum! /s legisl! /s know!)
(assum! /s legisl! /s awar!)
(assum! /s legisl! /s omnisc!)
(deem! /s legisl! /s know!)
(deem! /s legisl! /s awar!)
(deem! /s legisl! /s omnisc!)

Number of results
7,945
4,945
7
2,265
13
15
1,025
818
1
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story that judicial opinions collectively tell about the body of legal rules, we
can take these deemings to be assertions that the legislature “knows”
something that it might not actually have known or had the capacity to
know, and in that sense to be assertions imputing something like
omniscience—a superhuman state of knowledge—to the legislature.215 As
explained above, this characterization of the legislature has two distinct
components: the personification of the legislature, and the imputation to
that personified collective of certain unlikely knowledge. Because the
material discussed above has clearer implications for the second of these
components, this discussion will consider that component first.
The presence elsewhere in the law of imputations of unrealistic
knowledge (as discussed in Part III), and their complete acceptance in some
of those other areas, suggests that there is not necessarily anything
inherently problematic about the unrealistic nature of these imputations.
Indeed, the apparently independent development of these deemings in
diverse legal areas suggests that they might perform some useful function.
Whatever this function is, it is certainly not that of accurate description or
empirical truthfulness. But the deemings might be useful for other
purposes. The classic theory of legal fictions holds that such fictions have
value as tools for legal adjustment or as theoretical justifications for legal
rules. Neither of these accounts seems to fit the imputation of unrealistic
knowledge to a legislature. The work from psychologists and literary
scholars discussed in Part II, however, suggests a different sense in which
fictions can be useful: fictions that involve imputing mental states to
characters are useful, to readers, in exercising and confirming their abilities
to impute mental states to others as well as to engage in metacognition,
reflecting on and analyzing the sources and limits of their own beliefs and
predictions. Such imputations and analysis are not foolproof (we are
neither telepathic nor omniscient), but they are indispensable to our
everyday lives—and also to legal behavior and discourse.
(fict! /s legisl! /s know!)
(fict! /s legisl! /s awar!)
(fict! /s legisl! /s omnisc!)

293
22
3

215

As a further typical example of this kind of deeming, see Liberty Loan Corp. of
Illinois v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 142 Ill. App. 3d 838, 839 (1986) (“[T]he legislature is
presumed to be aware of judicial decisions which have construed prior legislation and
where no change is made are considered to be in accord with the decision.”) (citing In
Kozak v. Ret. Bd. of Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 218
(1983) (“We must presume that in adopting that amendment the legislature was aware of
judicial decisions concerning prior and existing law and legislation.”)).
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Within the judicial discourse world, when a judge imputes an unlikely
awareness to a legislature, the judge is telling a story in which the
legislature has knowledge that the judge him- or herself would, after all, not
necessarily have before doing research or receiving it from the
communications of parties or clerks. Considered in this light, the judge
imputing unrealistic knowledge to the legislature can be seen to be not
making an unfair demand, but describing (and enacting) what it would be
like to be omniscient, presenting that state as an ideal one for actors in the
legal system to have, and attributing that ideal state to the legislature as the
“narrator” or utterer of the body of statutory law.216 Judges might do this,
as well, to remind themselves and their colleagues of their obligations and
to reassert the basic rules of the game they are playing: the legal aspiration
to approach as nearly as possible to accurate mental-state imputation and to
complete and impartial access to and use of all pertinent information. 217 In
this regard, imputations of “omniscience” to the legislature can be
understood relatively simply as reaffirmations of these goals, reassertions of
them as the master rules of the legal game, and invitations to all engaged in
the legal game to keep taking the legislature’s pronouncements seriously, as
well as aspiring toward omniscience themselves, as they keep playing by
those rules.
Although it proceeds in unfamiliar terms, this explanation of the role
played by assertions of legislative omniscience is consistent with the
empirical and political values embraced in even the most recent
commentary on statutory interpretation. Aspirations to perfectly accurate
mental-state imputation and full command of the legal corpus can never be
fully met, to be sure, but empiricists aspire to a similar fully informed
perspective. They just propose a different path toward those goals. Indeed,
the ideals expressed in references to omniscience are arguably the key “rule
of law” principles that Professors Gluck and Bressman propose as a
216

This argument is consistent with but goes well beyond Professor Smith’s argument
that “[j]udges . . . cling to premises, either consciously or subconsciously, that will produce
legal rules with positive expressive value,” P. Smith, supra note ___, at 1478. Professor
Smith is ultimately unwilling to endorse this as a complete defense of legal fictions: “The
argument for dispensing with judicial candor is strongest when the court uses the new legal
fiction to serve a legitimating function, but even in such cases we must be skeptical about
the need for obfuscation.” Id. at 1491.
217
Cf. Nourse, supra note ___, at 1124 (describing resort to legislative history as
appropriate because it functions as a “process of externalized self-discipline by which the
interpreters’ ideological predispositions are measured against the best information about
other people’s meanings.”)
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potential justification for many of the canons they consider to be based on
inaccurate characterizations of the legislature.218 (Professors Gluck and
Bressman contend that for this justification to be a workable one, courts
must themselves actually behave consistently rather than merely aspire to
consistency; this argument, however, assumes that legislatures are the
primary or only audience for judicial opinions.)219
The account just provided suggests a value—a rhetorical, expressive
value rather than one related to truth or accuracy—for the judicial practice
of imputing unrealistic knowledge to a legislature. It has not addressed
whether the other component of the legislative omniscience fiction—the
personification of the legislature into something that can have a mental
state—has any similar value. Like the imputation of unrealistic knowledge,
the practice of personifying a collective for legal purposes occurs in many
areas of law, most obviously in the personification of business
associations.220 This Article, however, has not sought to canvass these
parallels; doing so is a job for another study. Nevertheless, the material
presented in Part II points toward some of the observations we could make
and some of the questions we should ask in such a study of personifying
fictions. For one thing, the personification of groups is not unique to legal
practices and ways of talking; from childhood we impute mental states to
things that cannot have them. 221 But does it make sense for us to think of
218

See supra note ___.
See supra note ___.
220
See supra note ___ [Radin and Cohen]. The logic of the preceding paragraphs
might suggest that the parallels confirm the utility of such personifications. There are,
however, important differences between imputations of unrealistic knowledge and
personifications of groups; most basically, the personification of groups does not seem
directly linked to openly avowed aims of the legal system, such as accurate mental-state
imputation and command of the legal corpus, in the same way that assumptions of
omniscience do. Omniscience is (an admittedly extreme expression of) a fundamental
legal ideal in a way that the treatment of groups as knowing agents is not.
221
See supra notes ___ and accompanying discussion [triangles]. Interestingly, the
popular response to the practice of personifying collectives tends to be far more skeptical
than the response of many commentators and judges. See, e.g., Dave Schmidt, Letter to the
Editor, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 30, 2011, at 6 (criticizing Tribune editorial supporting elimination
of tax deduction for mortgage interest payments: “Why should a business (which is, after
all, a legal fiction) be able to take out a loan for the purchase of an asset and write off the
interest but a family (made up of nonfictitious, real people) be unable to do the same thing?
. . . What you propose is an insult to the real, living, breathing persons who make up this
country at the expense of entities who only exist via the fiction of legal ‘personhood’ under
state corporate law.”); David Post, What’s Wrong with the Hobby Lobby Decision, WASH.
POST, July 9, 2014 (“I have a hard time conceptualizing how this fictional person, Hobby
Lobby, Inc., has a religion, and a hard time conceptualizing how it exercises that religion.”)
219
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reading the mind of a human group, or to aspire to do so, within the legal
discourse world? If we say that we can do so, are we confirming any basic
aspirations of our legal system? Might it make more sense to develop
another concept, another set of terms not identical to those we use to talk
about human beings, for explaining why we hold these groups responsible
for some of their group acts and for deciding when we will do so? Such an
approach could allow us to be more sensitive to the differences among the
various groups we recognize as legal actors. It might make sense, for
example, to impute to a group like a legislature, whose primary reason for
assembly and functioning as a group is the capacity to perform legal acts, a
legally ideal “mental state,”222 while it might not make as much sense to do
the same for groups assembled for other purposes.
CONCLUSION
Assumptions of legislative omniscience are routinely condemned by
commentators as unrealistic fictions that, because of their inaccuracy,
undermine judicial legitimacy. But the classic account of legal fictions does
not tell us exactly why these assumptions are problematic, largely because
that classic account has remained undeveloped since the early twentieth
century.
Advances in other disciplines toward a more nuanced
understanding of fictional discourse suggest several ways of improving our
understanding of legal fictions, including fictions of legislative
omniscience. When we take the insights of philosophers, cognitive
scientists, and literary scholars into account, and consider fictions of
legislative omniscience alongside similar, more widely accepted, unrealistic
imputations of knowledge to legal actors in other areas of law, we can
justify at least some elements of assumptions of legislative omniscience in a
new way. Judges’ imputations of unrealistic knowledge to legislatures are
not unfair demands, but important parts of the story judges tell about the
law, that story according to which judges are authorized to make legal
decisions; these imputations of omniscience assert, as a legal ideal, the
possibility of completely accurate detection of mental states and full
command of the legal corpus. In this way, these imputations are reminders
of the basic rules of the game judges and lawyers play. This account is not
a complete defense of judicial assumptions of legislative omniscience; it
(discussing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. ___ (2014)).
222
But see Nourse, supra note ___, at 1148-49 (describing purposivist view of
Congress as “describ[ing] judicial, not legislative, virtue: ‘precision in drafting,
consciousness of interpretive rules, discovery of meaning in past precedent, and detached
reflection on the language of particular texts.’”).
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leaves for another day a full answer to the question of whether the
personification of the legislature into an entity capable of knowledge is also
defensible. But as long as we treat the legislature as a legal actor, we
should not be concerned about imputing unrealistic knowledge to it. Far
from impairing judicial legitimacy, such imputations are expressions of the
grounds of judicial legitimacy.
***
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